Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/03/2008

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Zoning Bulletin grieved party could appeal a board's decision to court by filing a pe- tition for certiorari. To determine if the petitioners had standing to bring their claim, the appeals court had to decide whether they were "aggrieved parties" as defined by this state law. The pertinent law provided that: "[a]n aggrieved party [was] one who either show[ed] a legal interest in the property affected or, in the case of a 'nearby property owner, [showed] some special damage, distinct from the rest of the community, amounting to a reduction in value of [that owner's] property.''' While the lower court had concluded that the city zoning code protected "adjacent properties" by requiring tt.e board to make findings regarding the secondary effects of proposed "adult estab- lishments" on adjacent properties, the appeals court found that the reliance on city code was misplaced. The city code provisions did not address the issue of standing to contest a zoning decision; rath- er, the right to petition a trial court for certiorari was governed by state law. The appeals court found that the lower court's ruling contradicted a "longstanding precedent that mere ownership of adjoining prop- erty [was] insufficient to establish a petitioner's standing. There- fore, the trial court had erred by concluding that the petitioners had standing based solely on provisions of the Raleigh city code. In addition to establishing aggrieved party status, to grant cer- tiorari, a court had to determine whether an injury had resulted or would result from the zoning action. More than . merely stating a perceived injury, an aggrieved party had to allege the manner in which the value or enjoyment of his or her land had been or would be adversely affected specifically. The petitioners failed meet this. re- quirement as well. The petitioners did not present any specific evidence at trial that the value of their properties would decrease as a result of the issu- ance of the special use permit or that they would suffer damages "distinct from the rest of the community." The appeals court add- ed that the evidence presented by the petitioners at the hearing was "too general and speculative" to support a finding that an injury would result from the zoning action. Because the lower court had erred when it found that the peti- tioners had standing to ask the court to review the issuance of the special use permit, the resulting decision of the lower was invalid. The appeals court ordered the lower court to reinstate the special use permit issued by the board. See also: Lloyd v. Town of Chapel Hill, 489 S.p:.2d 898 (1997). 10 84 () (~) -' ( --)