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<br />April 10, 20081 Volume 21 No.7 <br /> <br />water lines. On January 3, 2003, after a public hearing, the board <br />voted to deny the plan. On October 7, 2003, the city took, pursuant <br />to its eminent domain powers, thirty-eight acres of Perez's property <br />for the purpose of water supply protection. The Clarks and Perez ar- <br />gued that the taking left their proposed subdivision plan unfeasible <br />because access to the subdivision was planned through that land. <br />The Clarks and Perez brought an action against the city, alleging <br />the city violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of <br />the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Spe- <br />cmcally, they alleged that the city conspired to interfere with the resi- <br />dential development of their lands. <br />The city asked the district court to dismiss the action, arguing the <br />action failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The <br />district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge who recom- <br />mended dismissal. The district court dismissed the action. <br />The Clarks and Perez appealed. <br /> <br />DECISION: Affirmed. <br /> <br />The court concluded that the facts presented by the Clarks and <br />Perez failed to show violations of their constitutional due process <br />and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The <br />court found their action was properly dismissed. <br />The court said that claimants were only entitled to relief under. <br />federal law, 42 U.s.e. ~ 1983, for a violation of substantive due <br />process rights if they could prove that: (1) they suffered a depriva- <br />tion of an established life, liberty, or property interest; and (2) such <br />deprivation occurred through governmental action that "shocks the <br />conscience. " <br />The court disagreed with the Clark-Perez contention that the <br />city's actions amounted to a pattern of arbitrary, unreasonable and <br />capricious acts that deprived themof their right to reasonable use of <br />their property. The court said that whether the Clarks and Perez had <br />a property interest in developing their land did not matter because <br />they failed to prove that the city engaged in behavior that shocked <br />the conscience. The court said that a discretionary permitting or li- <br />censing determination by state or local decision-makers could not or- <br />dinarily be challenged as violating substantive due process-whether <br />the decisions were right or wrong. The court stressed that the Clarks <br />and Perez neither alleged any fundamental procedural irregularity <br />nor alleged that a fundamental principle had been violated. They <br />had only complained they were denied necessary permits to devel- <br />op a residential subdivision and that the city denied those permits <br />in furtherance of its own interests. Consequently, the court held that <br />a "run-of-the-mill land-use case such as this one" did not rise to the <br />level of behavior that shocks the conscience. <br /> <br />9 <br /> <br />27 <br />