Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/05/2008

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.; ." ,;...; ., . " 84 Zoning Bulletin The court refused to find, as Megin argued it should, that Ache- son's participation at the business meeting was, by itself, a violation of Megin's right to fundamental fairness. Instead, the court said that its task was to determine whether Acheson's comments at the busi- ness meetmg included or was based on any fact or evidence that was not previously presented at the public hearing on Megin's appeal. If they did, then her participation was improper and violated Megin's right to fundamental fairness. The court found that Acheson offered no new information to the . board during their executive session deliberations. The court found her statement that Megin was saying the Property was a junkyard that was preexisting was an accurate description of Megin's testi- mony at the hearing. The court also found that her statement that there were "dozens" of vehicles on the Property was also referenced in her earlier memorandum, and was supported by photographs of the Property. The court found that her .statement that the issue of preexisting use first came up at the hearing was correct. The court further found that her statement that the Property was not a farm simply repeated her testimony at the public hearing. Because Acheson did not offer any fact or evidence at the business meeting that was not already evidence in the record, the court concluded that her par- ticipation in the meeting was not improper, and that Megin's right to fundamental fairness was not violated. See also: Pizzola v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Plainville, 167 Conn. 202, .355 A.2d 21 (1974) (holding modified by, Grimes v. Conservation Com'n of Town of Utchfield, 243 Conn. 266, 703 A.2d 101 (1997)); Norooz v. Inland Wetlands Agency of Town of Woodbury, 26 Conn. App. 564, 602 A.2d 613 (1992) Case Note: In its conclusion, the court further noted that even if Acheson's participation at the meeting had been improper, it would have been a harniIess deprivation of Megin's right to fundamental fairness. If Acheson had provided evidence to the board without Megin's opportunity to rebut it, the board would still have had the opportunity. to prove that the communication was harmless in that its decision would have been the same ab- sent that evidence. 4 \, : tT ~. , :~r:. .,; (OJ '- :. l.<."".-.... ; . \.". .,) C:. . !