Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/07/2008

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July 10, 20081 Volume 21 No. 13 The court noted that a property owner challenging a land-use regu- lation as a violation of substantive due process had to show that the zoning regulation: (1) was arbitrary and unreasonable in that it had no substantial relationship to public health, safety, or welfare; and (2) in- fringed upon the property owner's property interest. The court found that while the original non-illuminated sign may not have required a permit, Heerey was required to obtain' a permit when he illuminated and expanded the sign. Because Heerey did not obtain a permit, the sign was not lawful before the 1990 zoning change that banned adver- tising signs within 250 feet of a residential district. Accordingly, GASS had no protected property interest in the cOI).tinuance of the sign as a legal, non-conforming use. Without a protected property interest, the claim of a violation of substantive due process failed. The court also held that the grandfather provision found in ~ 6.7- l(a) of the zoning ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. The court said that although ~ 8.9(7) of the city's zoning ordinance regulated commercial speech, GASS did not challenge the constitu- tionality of ~ 8.9(7). GASS only challenged ~ 6.7-1(a). Because ~ 6.7- l(a) applied to all manners of signs, not just advertising signs, the -"~I court concluded that it was a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction on speech rather thana regulation of commercial speech. See also: Taylor v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Evanston, 375 Ill. App. 3d585, 314 Ill. Dec. 562, 874 N.E.2d 927 (1st Dist. 2007). See also: Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, 489 R3d 846 (7th Cir. 2007), art. denied, 128 S. Ct. 914, 169 L. Ed. 2d 786 (U.S. 2008). " Case Note: GASS had also argued that because of defects in the . permitting scheme prior to the 1990 changes, including a failure to place limits on the city's discretion to deny a permit or any time constraints on the city's decision to grantor deny a permit, the permit requirement was a nullity and the sign was a lawful use despite the lackof permits. The court rejected this argument for "vesting by estoppel". The court said GASS could not rely on the supposed illegality of a prior version of the zoning ordinance to transform its illegal use of the property into an authorized use and to give it a property interest in continued use of that prop- erty despite subsequent changes to the zoning code. @ 2008 Thomson Reuters/West 7 43