Laserfiche WebLink
<br />July 10, 20081 Volume 21 No. 13 <br /> <br />On appeal, the court determined that the city's zoning ordinance <br />did not violate the Missouri Billboard Act (the Act) (Mo. Rev. Stat. <br />~.~ 226.500 et seq.). In so determining, the court noted that the purpose <br />of the Act was to, among other objectives, reduce the number of sign- <br />boards crowding the highways. The court found that the Act provided <br />a set of default standards for new billboard construction. The court also <br />noted that another state statute, ~ 71.288, governed municipalities re- <br />strictions on olitdoor advertising (Mo. Rev. Stat. ~ 71.288). The court <br />found ~ 71.288 granted munlcipalities the authority to adopt regula- <br />tions with respect. to outdoor advertising that were "more restrictive <br />than the height, size, lighting arid spacing" provisions of the Act. <br />Ad Trend argued that the permissive language of the Act (e.g., <br />"outdoor advertising shall be permitted within [660] feet of the near- <br />est edge of the right-of-way of highways") coupled with the express <br />intent of the legislature to permit billboards (e.g., "the general assem- <br />bly finds and declares that outdoor advertising is a legitimate com- <br />mercial use ....") prohibited the city from banning all outdoor adver- <br />tising. The court disagreed. The court said that the permissive default <br />language and kgislative intent of the Act had to be read together with <br />the language of~ 71.288. The court said two statutes relating to 'the <br />same subject should be harmonized and read together as constituting <br />one law. The court found that because ~ 71.288 authorized munici- <br />palities to regulate the height, size, lighting, and spacing to any ex- <br />tent, it impliedly'authorized them to pass a total ban on signs. Thus, <br />the court concluded that an ordinance could-as it found the city's <br />ordinance did-mean: the maximUm area of a sign was to be no <br />greater than zero and the minimum spacing between signs was to be <br />infinite. The court concluded that the city could, under the Act and <br />S 71.288, ban new billboards. <br /> <br />See also: State v. Gilmore, 342 Mo. 1232, 119 S. W.2d 805 (1938). <br /> <br />.; <br />i <br /> <br />Case Note: Ad Trend had also argued that the city was required <br />to apply the ordinance in effect at the tim:e of its billboard permit <br />application, rather than the ordinance in effect when the' permit <br />was denied. The court refused to consider the argument, finding <br />Ad Trend failed to cite relevant authority or explain why such <br />authority. was not available. Similarly, the court refused to ad- <br />dress Ad Trend's argument that the city did not have ninety days <br />to determine whether or not to grant or deny the permit because <br />Ad Trend failed to cite any authority in support of its argument. <br /> <br />" <br /> <br />@ 2008 Thomson ReutersJWest <br /> <br />9 <br /> <br />45 <br />