Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/07/2008

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" July 25, 20081 Volume 21 No, 14 ; -) RobertSteinburg (Steinburg) was a citizen of the county. He spoke at the meeting. When he spoke he did not relate his comments to the devel- oper's deferral request. Instead he spoke in opposition to the developer's project and criticized the way the Commission was going about its busi- ness. Commissioner Daniel Gecker (Gecker) challenged Steinburg'scriti" cism and expressed his intent not to listen to it. Litton repeatedly asked Steinburg to' staY on the subject of the deferral request, He also asked Steinburg to stop being disorderly. Litton eventually had Steinburg re- moved from the meeting. . Steinburg brought an action against the Commission, Litton, and Gecker. Steinburg argued that they unconstitutionally silenced his speech: (1) by enforcing the unconstitutional Commission policy against "per- sonal attacks;" and (2) based on his viewpomt. The district court held against Steinburg. It concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Steinburg was silenced because of the Commission's policy against personal attacks. Therefore, the court re- fused to. reach the question raised by Steinburg of whether that policy was unconstitutional. Steinburg appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. \ The court concluded that the Commission, Litton, and Gecker did not I violate Steinburg's First Amendment rights in excluding him from the meeting because: (1) the Commission's policy against personal attacks was not facially unconstitutional; (2) in any case, Litton did not apply the "personal attacks" policy; and (3) Steinburg was not . discriminated against for his viewpoint, but was treated the same as other speakers and excluded for being off-topic and disorderly. In addressing whether the Commission unconstitutionally restricted Steinburg's speech in a public forum, the court first looked to the na- ture of the forum to determine the standard it had to apply, The court concluded that the Commission's public meeting was a "limited public forum." The court noted that governmental entities could create such fo- rums ill a specified location for a limited use, so long as the imposition of those limits did not discriminate based on the speaker's viewpoint. The court noted that in limited public forums, governments had substan- tial interest in having such meetings conducted with relative orderliness and fairness to all. In light of those interests, the court. said governments could impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions: They could set subject matter agendas and could cut off speech which they reason- ably perceived to threaten disruption of the orderly and fair progress of the discussion, whether by virtUe of the speech's irrelevance, its dura-, . tion, or its very tone and manner. Still, the court noted, official discretion was not limitless; governmental entities could not limit speech based on speaker viewpoint, and any restrictions had to be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum. @ 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest 7 55