Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/07/2008

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~ July 25, 20081Vo]ume 21 No. 14 /----. ing that Enclave's proposed business would be within 1,000 feet of an occupied single-family residence. Enclave appealed the city council's denial to the trial court. Enclave argued that under the applicable city ordinances, the city council. could only consider the grounds the city staff had invoked in denying Enclave's license application. The city council argued that, contrary to Enclave's interpretation, the ordinances allowed the city council to consider all evidence relevant to the denial of a license application. The trial court found in favor of the city council. Enclave appealed. The court of appeals reversed. It agreed with Enclave's argument. It found that the city ordinance restricted the city council to considering only the grounds for denial provided by the city staff. It concluded that the city council therefore had no choice but to issue the license because the grounds provide by the city staff for the license denial did not include the existence of an occupied single-family residence. The city appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado. DECISION: Reversed and remanded. . The court held that the city's ordinances allowed the city council to re- o -fuse issuance of the license based on the existence of an occupied single- family residence located within 1,000 feet of Enclave's proposed sexually oriented business. Enclave had argued that under the applicable ordinances, the city council could only consider the grounds the city staff had invoked in de- nying Enclave's license application. In support of its argument, Enclave had pointed to language in ~ 9A56(d) of the city's ordinance. That sec- tion of the ordinance provided that in the event the city staff denied a license application, it had to "make findings of fact stating the reason for the denial" and send a copy of the decision to the applicant. The or- dinance further provided that. the applicant was entitled to a hearing on the denial before the city council, and at the hearing the city council had 'to "heat such statements and consider such evidence. . . which is rel- evant to the 'denial of the license application by the [city staff]. " Arguing contrary to Enclave's interpretation of ~ 9A56(d) of the city's ordinance, the city had argued that the ordinance allowed the city council to consider all evidence relevant to the denial of a license application. In support of its interpretation, the city council had pointed to subsection (2) of the same ordinance provision. That subsection (2) pr~vided that if the city council determined that the applicant was ineligible for a license under the criteria of the ordinance, the city council must deny the application. @ 2008 Thomson Reuters/West' 11 59