Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/04/2008

Home

i ! ;. j: i: i j; I' i I. I, I i I I: " !' j: I, I' I i: d Ii i -11 Ji t, i' ;I ~ i .... j' Ii August 25, 2008 I Volume 21 No. 16. hensive perrit to build low and moderate income housing. This allowed developers to avoid having to file separate applications to the applicable local municipal boards. . Pascoag Apartment AssoCiates LLC and Yorkshire Properties (Pasco- ag), Crystal Lake Builders, LLC (Crystal Lake), and East Avenue Devel- opment Realty, LLC (East Avenue) (collectively, the Developers) were all for-profit developers who submitted comprehensive permit applications to the town for housing developments under the Act. ' While the Developers applications were pending, Rhode Island's Gen- eral Assembly (GA) imposed a moratorium on applications by for-profit developers. The GA allowed developers affected by the moratorium to move forward if their applications were determined by the State Hous- ing Appeals Board (SHAB) to have reached "substantial completeness" by February 13, 2004. Under the Act, the SHAB could find substantial completeness was achieved if it determined that: (1) a zoning board of review acted in a manner that showed it considered the application sub- stantially complete; or (2) the application achieved substantial complete- ness of eaeh of ten specified factors. After the moratorium went into effe.ct, the toWn's zoning board of review (ZBR) declined to allow the applications to proceed. The ZBR' determined that the Developers' applications were not substantially com- plete because they each failed to meet one or more of the ten factors. The Developers' appealed to the SHAB. The SHAB, applying the ten- factors-test, concluded that each of the Devel()pers had submitted a com- prehensivepermit application that was substantially complete as of Feb- ruary 13, '2004. The town petitioned the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, asking it to review SHAB's substantial-completeness determination for each of the Developers. The town argued SHAB: (1) erred in formulating its stan- dard of review for substantial completeness because it looked beyond the submitted application materials to whether or not there would be an op- portunity to continue to complete the materials in the course and con- duct of future hearings; and (2) erred in finding each of the Developers applications was sUDstantially complete because each had "material defi- ciencies" and failed to.meet all ten determinative factors. The court agreed to review the matter. DECISION: Reversed and remanded. The court first determined that the term "substantial completeness" was not defined in the GA's amendments to the Act. The court concluded that because the SHAB was clearly tasked with determining whether sub- stantial completeness was achieved, its interpretation of the phrase "sub- stantial'completeness" warranted deference, prbvided it was not clearly'w @ 2008 Thomson ReuterslWest . 11 105