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<br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />Zoning Bulletin <br /> <br />February 25, 2009 I Volume 3 I No.4 <br /> <br />determined that the use of chemicals for mineral processing posed an <br />) "unacceptable environmental and public health risk." The Ordinance <br />effectively prohibited in the county a certain type of mining technique <br />customarily used in the mineral industry to extract precious metals, <br />such as gold. <br />The Colorado Mining Association (the "CMA") challenged the Or- <br />dinance. It argued the Ordinance was preempted by Colorado's Mined <br />Land Reclamation Act (the "MLRA"). Under the MLRA, the Colo- <br />rado General Assembly had given the Mined Land Reclamation Board <br />(the "Board") the authority to authorize the use of such mining tech- <br />niques, but only under the terms of an Environmental Protection Plan <br />designed for each operation "sufficient to protect human health, prop- <br />erty, and the environment." <br />On the CMA's challenge, the county court ruled that the MLRA pre- <br />empted the county's Ordinance. <br />On the county's appeal, the court of appeals reversed that judgment. <br />That court held that the MLRA neither expressly nor impliedly pre- <br />empted the Ordinance. <br />The CMA appealed. <br /> <br />.DECISION: Reversed. <br /> <br />) <br /> <br />The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the Ordinance was not <br />expressly preempted by the MLRA. However, it also held that the Or- <br />dinance was impliedly preempted by the MLRA. <br />In reaching its conclusion, the court explained that state law <br />would preempt local law where, among other circumstances: the <br />General Assembly had expressed clear intent to preempt local law; <br />there was outright' or actual conflict between state and local law; <br />compliance with both state and local law was physically impossible; <br />or state law was so comprehensive as to occupy the entire field of <br />regulation. The court noted that there were three ways in which a <br />state statute could preempt a county ordinance: express preemption; <br />implied preemption; and operational preemption. The court further <br />noted that express and implied preemption were "primarily matters <br />of statutory interpretation." <br />Interpreting the MLRA, the court concluded that the MLRA did not <br />expressly preempt the county Ordinance. In reaching that conclusion, <br />the court noted that the two sections of the MLRA that addressed the <br />relationship between the MLRA and local land use ordinances assumed <br />that the MLRA and ordinances would apply to mining operations in <br />a compatible manner. One of those sections provided that the Board <br />could not deny a reclamation permit to a mining operator if the op- <br />erator demonstrated compliance with federal, state, and local laws. The <br />. court held that the MLRA therefore recognized (and thus did not ex- <br /> <br />@ 2009 Thomson Reuters 9 <br /> <br />~' <br /> <br />99 <br />