Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/09/2009

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May 25,20091 Volume 31 No. 10 Zoning Bulletin billboard would not be: "detrimental to [the] health, safety, peace, mor- als, comfort, and general welfare of persons residing or working in the neighborhood [in which the billboard was proposed] . . . or to the gen- eral welfare of the [c]ounty." As required by the Ordinance, Stott applied for permits to Construct the billboards. The Commission. denied the applications. Stott then appealed the de- nials to the county's Board of Supervisors (the "Board"). The Board de- nied the appeals. Thereafter, Stott brought a legal action against the county. Stott con- tended that the Ordinance wasuncbnstitutional. Specifically, Stott argued that the Ordinance restricted commercial and non-cQmmercial speech in violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it did not set forth "narrow, objective and definite standards," but rather granted county officials "unfettered discretion to allow or deny" signs. Stott also argued that the application of the Ordinance violated the First Amendment in that it effectively prohibited all off-site billboards. The county maintained that the Ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. , Both parties moved for summary judgment. They each asked the court to find that there were nl? material issues of fact and to decide the matter in their favor on the law alone. .~) /\ ; ) DECISION: County's motion for summary judgment granted. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor- nia held that the Ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. In reaching its conclusion,. the court noted that although Stott only constructed billboards, Stott's claims still involved speech. This was be- cause billboards combined both "communicative and noncommuni- cative aspects" and "regulation of the non communicative aspects. . . [could] iri:1pingeD to some degree on the communicative aspects." Since billboards were used to display both commercial and non-commercial speech, the court addressed the constitutional protections afforded to both forms of speech. . The court explained that commercial speech could be restricted if the restriction: (1) sought to implement a substantial governmental inter- . est; (2) directly advanced that interest; and (3) reached no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. Here, the court foun~d that the Ordinance's requirement that county officials make findings that pro- posed signs would not have any detrimental effects as to specific interests to personsiri the neighborhood or to the general welfare of the county ( ) . did not, as Stott had characterized, leave the county with "unbridled dis- '= . cretion." It W8,S not a "prior restraint on speech." Rather, it required offi- 10 @ 2009 Thomson Reuters 50 ; ; ! i I I ! i I I I I i 1 ; I i '. I i I ! i I i i I I I I ! j j ! I j I i I i I I I ! i j I I I ,) i ! i InI I I I I I 1