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<br />Zonin'g Bulletin <br /> <br />June 10, 20091 Volume 3\ No, 11 <br /> <br />(=<-\ <br />, i <br /> <br />tained that unless and until the township attempted to enforce the Ordi- <br />nance in a manner inconsistent with state law, the AG could not bring an <br />action to challenge it. <br />The Commonwealth Court agreed with the township. It held that the <br />AG could only challenge an ordinance, that existed prior to the effective <br />date of Chapter three if it alleged that the municipality sought to enforce <br />the ordinance. The court reasoned this was because: (1) although S 315 <br />authorized the AG to bring an action challenging an unauthorized local <br />ordinance; (2) S 313(b) specified that, as to ordinances thai: existed prior <br />to its effective date, Chapter three applied only to their enforcement. <br />The AG appealed. <br /> <br />DECISION: Reversed and remanded. <br /> <br />I <br />I <br />1 <br />I <br />1 <br />1 <br />I <br />I <br />! <br />i <br />L <br />I <br /> <br />/"""-. <br />./ \ <br />\. ) <br /> <br />On appeal, the Supreme Court of :pennsylvania held that, although <br />the township had pot attempted. to enforce the Ordinance, the AG could <br />challenge it under Chapter 3 of ACRE. <br />In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the "plain language" of <br />Chapter three. It found that the "distinction" in ~313(b) between preex- <br />isting and subsequently enacted -ordinances was "simply a common sense <br />recognition that local townships c[ould not] be prevented from enacting ex- <br />isting ordinances, as th[at] conduct ha[d] already occurred, and it would be <br />futile to prohibit the enactment of ordinances which in fact ha[ d] already <br />been enacted." Thus, the court found that Chapter three regulated: "the fu- <br />ture conduct of local townships by preventing them from enforcing already <br />enacted ordinances becausethe statute [could not] reach back in time to <br />prevent local governments from enacting such ordinances." <br />The court found further support in its interpretation in the fact that <br />the definition of "unauthorized local ordinance" included both ordi- <br />,nances that were "enacted" and those that were "enforced." Moreover <br />S 315 authorized AG action without requiring the AG wait until an or- <br />dinance was enforced. <br /> <br />j <br />I <br />i <br />I <br />1 <br />! <br />1 <br />1 <br />1 <br />, <br />, <br />i <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />j <br />I <br />I <br />\ <br /> <br />L_.__.____ .._.' <br /> <br />See also: Arsenal Coal Co. v. Com., Dept. of Environmental Resources, <br />SDS Pa. 198,477 A.2d 1333, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20550 (1984). <br /> <br />() <br />~/ <br /> <br />Case Note: The court's decision abolished a prior case, Com., Office <br />of Attorney General ex reI. Corbett v. Lower Oxford Tp., 915 A.2d <br />685 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), order aftd, 594 Pa. 24, 934 A.2d <br />699 (2007) and (abrogated by, Com., Office of Atty. Gen. ex rel. <br />Corbett v. Locust Tp., 968 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2009))-which had held <br />that ACRE only permitted the AG to bring an action when a mu- <br />nicipality sought to enforce an unauthorized local ordinance. <br /> <br />9 <br /> <br />@2009 Thomson Reuters <br /> <br />!' <br /> <br />61 <br />