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<br />. \ <br />} <br /> <br />Zoning Bulletin <br /> <br />July 10, 20091 Volume 31 No. 13 <br /> <br />After holding a meeting on the subject, the county zoning administra- <br />tor issued a zoning verification letter to Crucible. The letter stated that <br />Crucible's proposed facility "would be classified as a 'schoo1.'" It also <br />stated that "[v]ermcation [wa]s ... subject to change." <br />In July 2005, Crucible purchased the Property for $2,250,000. <br />On August 24, 2005, the county's Board of Supervisors adopted a <br />zoning ordinance (the "Ordinance") that requited a conditional use per- <br />mit for the location of a school in an A-1 zoning district. After theadop- <br />tion of the Ordinance, Crucible, which did not have an approved site <br />plan, could no longer operate a school on its. property on a "by right" <br />basis, unless it was determined that it had a vested right to do so. <br />Without requesting a vested rights determination frdm the zoning ad- <br />ministrator, Crucible filed an action in court. It asked the coutity's circuit <br />court to determine whether it had a vested right to develop a school on <br />its property on a "by right" basis. <br />The Board of Supervisors and the county (hereinafter collectively, the <br />"Board) argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over the issue. <br />It argued this was because Crucible had not exhausted its administra- <br />tive remedies. The Board contended that Crucible was required to seek a <br />'. vested rights determination from the county zoning administrator before <br />filing an action in court. <br />The circuit court held that: (1) Crucible was not required to first seek <br />a vested rights determination from the zoning administrator before fil- <br />ing an action in court; and (2) Crucible had a vested right to develop a <br />school on the Property on a "by right" basis because the zoning verifica- <br />. tion letter constituted a "significant affirmative governinental act." <br />The Board appealed. <br /> <br />DECISION: Affirmed in part and reversed in part. <br /> <br />The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Crucible was not required to <br />seek a vested rights determination from the zoning administrator before <br />filing its action in circuit court. The court explained that, historically, cir- <br />cuit courts had been empowered to make vested rights determinations. <br />In 1993, the Virginia General Assembly had, under current Code ~ 15.2- <br />2286, granted zoning administrators the authority to make vested rights <br />determinations. The court noted that Code ~ 15.2-2286 did not: (1) take <br />away the courts power to make vested rights determinations; (2) require <br />a zoning administrator to make a vested rights 'determination before a <br />party could seek a vested rights determination from a circuit court; or <br />(3) make the zoning administrator's authority exclusive. Accordingly, the <br />court concluded that zoning administrators and circuit courts had con- <br />current jurisdiction to make vested rights determinations. Thus, Cru- <br />cible could obtain a vested rights determination from the county's cir- <br /> <br />'f ) <br />'~ <br /> <br />@ 2009 Thomson Reuters <br /> <br />11 <br /> <br />53 <br />