Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/03/2009

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August 10, 20091 Volume 31 No. is Zoning Bulletin The court said that the Planning Board's decision to grant party status to Nergaard and Stern did not demonstrate that the two men were "ag- grieved parties," entitling them to appeal to the Zoning Board. In order to, have standing, they had to demonstrate that they: (1) had party status at the Planning Board's proceedings; and (2) also had suffered a particu- larized injury or harm. In other words, being allbwed to make a case to the Planning Board did not relieve them of showing the particularized injury necessary to require the Zoning Board to accept their appeal. The court explained that "[a] particularized injury occurs when a judgment or order adversely and directly affects a party's property, pecu- niary, or personal rights." Here, Nergaard and Stern had no property or economic interest affected directly or indirectly by the boat ramp permit. They argued only that they had a particularized injury because they lived in the town and drove by the site frequently, "risking death, injury, and damage to their property." They maintained that "although any resident of the Town could claim these same injuries, the injuries [were] particu- larized because they [were] distinct from any generalized injury to the public." The court rejected this argument. It said that in order for Ner- gaard and Stern's claimed injury to be "particularized," it had to be "dis- tinct from the harm experienced by the public at large." The court found their claimed harm was not so "distinct," because there was no differ~ ence between Nergaard and Stern's potential harm and: (1) the potential harm to the 1638 drivers and their passengers who used the same road daily; and/or (2) the potential harm to every person who lives on or visits the town. See also: Norris Family Associates, LLC v. Town of Phipps burg, 2005 ME 102,879 A,2d 1007,2005 WL 2036021 (Me. 2005). See also: Ricci v. Superintendent, Bureau of Banking, 485 A.2d 645 (Me. 1984). Case Note: Nergaard and Stern had conceded that they did not claim to be abutters, and they did not raise that issue on appeal. Therefore the court did not address it. Case Note: The court explained that whether a party has standing to bring an administrative appeal depends on. the language of the governing ordinance. Thus, here, the court's analysis as to Nergaard and Stern's standing required the court to interpret and apply the relevant sections of the town's Ordinance. 8 @ 2009 Thomson Reuters 62 /~ ( ) /~) ( ! \ \. i I \\ II !, II I I \ II II II \ i I I I I 'I II I I i I I II I i I II I .. !l ii Ii I. I) I' , " I: Ii d !i 'I \1 q Ii Ii 'I :\