Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/03/2009

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'("--"\ , i ,--j ',I {J Zoning Bulletin September 10, 20091 Volume 31 No. 17 ~, C '>> "-oj In April 2005, the county Board of Commissioners (the "Board"): (1) enacted an ordinance that changed the configuration of the hazardous waste corridor, greatly reducing its size; and (2) approved EnergySolu- tions' request to amend its 1987 CUP to include its newly acquired por- tion of the Property. Subsequently, CME initiated in district court a declaratory and in- verse condemnation action against the county and EnergySolutioris. CME asserted that the Board's April 2005 decisions were "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal" because they: (1) ignored existing land use ordi- nance; (2) ignored notice requirements; and (3) evidenced a bias in favor of EnergySolutions. In May 2005, after CME filed suit, Broken Arrow exercised its op- tion to purchase parcel B of the Property from CME. Broken Arrow then sold that property to EnergySolutions who then leased it to CME. In the district court,_ EnergySolutions moved for summary judgment. It asserted that there were no material issues of fact in dispute and asked the court to rule in its favor on the law alone. Among other things, it specifically argued that CME lacked standing to'bring the action. _ The district court granted EnergySolutions motion. It held that CME lacked standingro challenge the county's decisions. CME appealed. It argued that it had both statutory and alterna- tive standing. - DECISION: Reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court of Utah held that CME had standing under both: (1) state statute; and (2) the "alternative standing test." The court held that CME had statutory standing to challenge each of the Board's April 2005 decisions because CME had adequately alleged that it was "adversely affected" by the decisions. Utah's County Land Use, Development, and Management Act ("CLUDMA") (Utah Code Ann. ~ 17-27a-801(2)(a)) governed land use challenges. The court ex- plained that, under CLUDMA, CME would have standing to challenge the Board's April 2005 decisions if it could show that it was "adverse- ly affected" by them. CME could show it was "adversely affected" if it could show it had a "personal stake" in the decisions such that it was directly affected by the decisions in a way that the rest of the community was not. To have a "personal stake" in the outcome of the decisions, CME had to own or occupy property within the countY. Here, the court found that. CME had the necessary "personal stake" .because, at the time it initiated the action in district court, it owned parcel B of the Property, which was located in the county. CME had alleged that the amendment to EnergySolutions' CUP potentially harmed CME due to the proximity of the properties owned by CME and EnergySolutions. This was suffi- cient to show a personal stake in the Board's decisions and give CME statutory standing. @ 2009 Thomson Reuters 7 65