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<br />o <br /> <br />() <br /> <br />( ... <br />-~ <br /> <br />Zoning Bulletin <br /> <br />November 10,20091 Volume31 No. 21 <br /> <br />RTM then sued the -city.in federal court. RTM alleged that the <br />Code's disparate treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech <br />violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. <br />Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding <br />on the law alone, the federal district court issued summary judgment <br />in favor of the city. It found that the Code did not violate the First <br />Amendment. It concluded that: the fact that commercial signs in the <br />city were far more numerous than noncommercial signs provided an <br />"adequate rationale for treating them differently given the objective of <br />reducing visual clutter and distraction along public roadways." <br />RTM appealed. <br /> <br />DECISION: Affirmed. <br /> <br />The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that <br />the Code's prohibition on off-premises commercial signs did not vio- <br />late the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause in treating commercial <br />signs' differently than noncommercial signs. <br />In so holding, the court explained that comtnerci~l speech restrictions <br />were evaluated under a four-part framework: (1) The First Amendment <br />protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity <br />and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial <br />speech is valid only if it: "(2) seeks to implemerit a substantial govern- <br />ment interest"; "(3) directly -advances that interest"; and "(4) reaches no <br />- further than necessary to accomplish the given objective." - <br />RTM had argued that the Code was unconstitutional and invalid <br />because it failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of that frame- <br />work. More specifically, RTM argued that the Code: "failed to articu- <br />late any reason for distinguishing between commercial and noncom- <br />mercial billboards relevant to safety and aesthetics." <br />The court acknowledged that where an ordinance's distinction be- <br />tween commercial and noncommercial billboards produces only a '''min- <br />ute' benefit," the ordinance would be invalid in violation of the First <br />Amendment. However, where there was a "reasonable fit" between (1) <br />an ordinance's distinction between commercial and noncommercial bill- <br />boards and (2) the asserted interests (i.e., safety and aesthetics), the ordi- <br />nance would be found valid. In other words, if a city could justify ban- <br />ning commercial speech "based on the severity of its contribution to the <br />city's problems (either from number or particularized harm)," the city <br />could treat commercial and noncommercial speech differently. <br />Here, the court found that the Code was valid because there was a- <br />"reasonable fit" between the Code and the asserted interests of safety and <br />aesthetics. The Code "was specifically crafted to address the safety and <br />aesthetic concerns associated with billboards." Also the city produced <br />"substantial evidence that: (1) the vast majority of the area billboards <br />[were] commercial[;] and (2) the [Code] [had] been effective, reducing <br /> <br />@ 2009 Thomson Reuters <br /> <br />3 <br /> <br />31 <br />