Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/05/2010

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May 25, 2010 'Volume 41 No. 10 Zoning Bulletin Virginia Code § 54.1-2310 defined "cemetery" as: "[A]ny land or structure used for intended to be used for the interment of human re- mains." "Interment" was defined as "all forms of final disposal of hu- man remains including, but not limited to, earth burial, mausoleum, entombment and niche or columbarium inurnment." The court found the examples of "interment" provided under the statute shared a com- mon feature: "a permanent resting place either underground or in a con- fined space or container." Also, the court found "the mere scattering of human remains above ground is not a 'final disposal' comparable to a burial underground or in a mausoleum, niche or columbarium." In fact, noted the court, the final sentence of the statutory definition of "inter- ment" stated that "[t]he sprinkling of ashes on church grounds shall not constitute interment." Also, the court noted, the dictionary also defined "interment" as "the act or ceremony of depositing a dead body in a grave or tomb." In conclusion, the court found that none of these sources of defini- tions of "cemetery" and "interment" supported Shilling's argument that the scattering of cremains on the Site created a cemetery. Rather, the court concluded that a cemetery did not exist on the Site prior to or at the time the urn containing the cremated remains of Shilling's mother was buried. As such, the interment of that urn at the Site violated the county's Cemetery Ordinance requiring a special use permit to use the land as a cemetery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Shil- ling's action. See also: Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 585 S.E.2d 780 (2003). Case Note: The court also found that Virginia Code §§ 15.2-978, 54.1-2808.1, 57-27.2, and 57-38.1, which govern the disposal of human remains and disinterment, all supported its conclusion that the scattering of cremains does not constitute a cemetery or interment. - Duration of Rights —Special permit holder fails to construct road within lapse period Permit holder says other activities were sufficient to prevent the lapse of the permit Citation: Silverleaf Resorts, Inc., Nettie R. Hammond, Trustee of Ham- mond Family Nominee Trust v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals for Town of Lanesborough, 2010 WL 1367334 (Mass. Land Ct. 2010) MASSACHUSETTS (04/07/10)—This case addressed the issue of whether a special permit holder's actions were sufficient to prevent the lapse of the permit. 8 ©2010 Thomson Reuters 156