Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/05/2010

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Zoning Bulletin June 25, 2010 Volume 4 No. 12 Still, the court noted that a presumption of validity does not apply to piecemeal zoning (i.e., the change from one zoning classification to another, of a particular property). Rather, the court noted that such a zoning change was, by definition, a "derogation of the comprehensive zoning scheme." In any case, the court held that the passage of the Or- dinance did not amount to improper "piecemeal zoning" because there was no change in the zoning classification of the Arena. The Arena was in the same zoning district (B-5) before and after the Ordinance was enacted. The only change was the addition of a conditional use to the uses allowed in the B-S district. The Opponents had also argued that the Ordinance constituted "il- legal spot zoning." The court disagreed. The court explained that "[s] pot zoning occurs when a small area in a [zoning district] is placed in a different zoning classification than the surrounding property." Again, the court noted that the Arena property "was not rezoned at all; its zoning classification remained the same." Nevertheless, the Opponents argued "that, even if no actual zoning re- classification of the Arena property occurred, the virtually simultaneous enactment of the Ordinance and [Ordinance 03-515, which granted the conditional use to the city] was tantamount to a reclassification" and thus tantamount to illegal spot zoning. Again the court disagreed. It found the city was not treating the Arena property as if its zoning classification had been changed. Rather, "there never were, and still are not, any zoning districts in [the city] in which new billboards were (are) permitted uses." Here, the Ordinance only adopted "a zoning vehicle" for the City to use to seek to obtain an exception from the Billboard Moratorium. Finally, the court also concluded that the passage of the Ordinance did not amount to illegal "contract zoning." The court explained that con- tract zoning occurs when: the zoning authority and applicant/property owner contractually agree how the property in question will be zoned. Here, the court found there was no evidence of any sort of a contract be- tween the City Council and the Arena property owner (i.e., the City) and its Arena -tenant involving an agreement as to how the Arena was to be zoned. Moreover, the court found that the Ordinance "did not confer a special privilege" upon the City as Arena -owner or on the Arena -tenant. This was because the Ordinance only made the Arena property eligible to apply for the conditional use permit for new billboards. See also: Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002). Case Note: The court also held that the ordinance (Ordinance 03-515) that granted a conditional use to the City for the Arena property was supported by substantial evidence in the record. © 2010 Thomson Reuters 5 177