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Zoning Bulletin September 10, 2010 Volume 41 No. 17 <br />cord did not include all of the evidence that was necessary to overturn <br />the decisions of the [ B]oard and [Commission]." Namely, they claimed <br />that the Board and Commission were unaware of the engineer's con- <br />flict of interest and that the court did not have evidence related to this <br />conflict when it dismissed Dohnna's Original Complaint. The court re- <br />jected Dohnna's argument, finding: they should have raised it in a di- <br />rect appeal from the action of the Board; and that Dohnna had made <br />no effort to submit such evidence to the court on that appeal. <br />Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that even when plaintiffs (i.e., <br />those bringing the action) did not exhaust their administrative reme- <br />dies, there were certain instances where they could institute collateral <br />actions. Still, generally, collateral attacks could not be made on zoning <br />decisions. They were only allowed where "a previously unchallenged <br />condition was so far outside what could have been regarded as a valid <br />exercise of zoning power that there could not have been any justified <br />reliance on it, or in which the continued maintenance of a previous- <br />ly unchallenged condition would violate some strong public policy." <br />Here, however, the court found that Dohnna had made no argument <br />that would "rise to the level of a public policy violation sufficient to <br />support a collateral attack" —such as an argument that the Board or <br />Commission exceeded its power, participated in misconduct, or had <br />members with a conflict of interest. Accordingly, the court concluded <br />that Dohnna could not maintain a collateral action. <br />Having found Dohnna failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, <br />the circumstances did not warrant an exception to the doctrine of ex- <br />haustion of administrative remedies, and Dohnna could not maintain a <br />collateral attack —the court affirmed the dismissal of Count I. <br />See also: George V. Town of Watertown, 85 Conn. App. 606, 858 A.2d <br />800 (2004). <br />See also: Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 851 A.2d 1165, <br />189 Ed. Law Rep. 741, 21 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1078 (2004). <br />See also: Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of North Ha- <br />ven, 224 Conn. 96, 616 A.2d 793 (1992). <br />Case Note: L & L had also asked the trial court to dismiss Count <br />II of the complaint, which involved an unrelated project. The trial <br />court dismissed it, and the appellate court affirmed that dismiss- <br />al, finding Dohnna "failed to bring an administrative appeal and <br />ma[de] no argument that the administrative action [was] void." <br />© 2010 Thomson Reuters 7 <br />69 <br />