Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/06/2011

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30 November 10, 20101 Volume 4 I No. 21 Zoning Bulletin The county asked the court to dismiss the action. The county argued that the Morrises had failed to successfully state a claim upon which relief could be granted by the court. DECISION: Denied in part. The United States District Court, District of Delaware, concluded that the Morrises had sufficiently stated a claim for a violation of pro- cedural due process under the 14th Amendment. The court refused to dismiss the Morrises' action. In.its decision, the court explained that in order for the Morrises' 14th Amendment procedural due process violation claim to succeed, the Morrises had to show that: (1) they had "a protectable interest — of life, liberty or property;" and (2) the county deprived them of that protectable interest; and (3) the county's procedure for challenging the deprivation did not satisfy the requirements of due process. The Morrises had claimed that they had a protected liberty interest in their right to use their property in the manner they saw fit without government interference. The court disagreed. It stated that "the right to use one's property as he or she wishes is not a fundamental right in the constitutional sense." This interest claimed by the Morrises was not a "liberty interest" protected by the 14th Amendment. Rather, the liberty interest protected by the 14th Amendment typically protected only freedom from bodily restraint and punishment that imposed an "atypical and significant hardship." (i.e., "unjustified intrusions on personal security "). The court, however, did fmd that the Morrises had a protectable property interest, both in: (1) the unrestricted use and enjoyment of their land; and (2) maintaining the use of their money between `(a) the time of paying the [instant ticket] and (b) the time of [review].' The court also found that the Morrises had sufficiently alleged that the county's ITS deprived them of those protectable property interests, as they alleged that payment of the ticket fee was a condition precedent to any opportunity to contest the charge. See also: DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. County of DeKalb, Ga., 106 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997). See also: City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 123 S. Ct. 1895, 155 L. Ed. 2d946 (2003). Case Note: In its decision, the court only addressed the county's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court was evaluating the suf- ficiency of the Morrises' claim, but did not make a decision on the merits of the claim (i.e., whether, in fact, the county ordinance violated the Morrises procedural due process rights). (The court did, however, note that it found, based on the evidence before it 6 © 2010 Thomson Reuters