Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/06/2011

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Zoning Bulletin November 25, 2010 Volume 41 No. 22 Thereafter, abutting land owners, John K. Rudolph and Kathy L. Gunst (collectively, "Rudolph "), appealed the CEO's decision to the town's Zoning Board of Appeals (the "Board "). They argued that Gol- ick's proposed use constituted "Commercial Recreation," which was prohibited in the applicable zoning district. The town's zoning ordinance (the "Ordinance ") defined "Commercial Recreation" as: "[a]ny commer- cial enterprise which receives a fee in return for the provision of some recreational activity .... Golick maintained that the proposed use fell under the Ordinance's defi- nition of "animal husbandry," which was allowed in the applicable zon- ing district. "Animal Husbandry" was defined under the Ordinance as: the "keeping of any domesticated animals other than household pets." The Board found Golick's proposed use was "animal husbandry." The Board affirmed the CEO's grant of Golick's building permit. Rudolph appealed. The superior court reversed the CEO's decision to issue the permit. The court found Golick's plan more closely constituted "commercial recreation" than "animal husbandry" and thus was a pro- hibited activity in Golick's zoning district. Golick appealed. The Court's Decision: Judgment of superior court vacated and matter remanded. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that Golick's operation of a horse boarding enterprise constituted the permitted use of "animal husbandry," even though the enterprise was expected to earn a profit. In reaching its conclusion, the court construed the language of the Or- dinance. The court found that Golick's contention that the boarding of horses constituted "animal husbandry" was supported by both: the Or- dinance's definition of "animal husbandry;" and the "ordinarily accepted meanings" (i.e., dictionary definitions) of "animal husbandry." Further, the court found the language of the Ordinance did not prohibit the earn- ing of income from the keeping of others' domesticated animals. In fact, noted the court: "Agriculture and farming historically are commercial enterprises by which people make a living." "The capacity to engage in agriculture involving livestock in a specified zoning district necessarily encompasses the capacity of a landowner to derive income from the ani- mal husbandry enterprise." Thus, here, the court found that "earning profit alone did not ": re- move Golick's proposal from the definition of "animal husbandry;" and make Golick's proposal that of "commercial recreation." Accordingly, the court concluded that Golick's proposed horse boarding enterprise was permitted in the zoning district. See also: Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2002 ME 81, 797 A.2d 27 (Me. 2002). See also: Borrelli v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Middletown, 106 Conn. App. 266, 941 A.2d 966 (2008). ® 2010 Thomson Reuters 5 41