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Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/03/2011
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Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/03/2011
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Agenda
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Planning Commission
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02/03/2011
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August 25, 2010 Volume 41 No. 16 Zoning Bulletin <br />DECISION: Affirmed. <br />The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the <br />zoning board's application of the four criteria did not violate Mel - <br />rose's First Amendment free speech rights. The court said the applica- <br />tion of the criteria was a "permissible `context- sensitive' analysis." <br />In reaching this decision, the court explained that First Amend- <br />ment analysis first requires a determination of whether a statute <br />(i.e., here the zoning code and the application of the four criteria) <br />is content -based or content- neutral. If the statute is content - based, <br />it is valid only if the government can show "that the regulation is <br />necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrow- <br />ly drawn to achieve that end." If the statute is content - neutral —in <br />that it "merely restricts the total quantity of speech by regulating <br />the time, the place or the manner in which one can speak " —it is <br />valid only if the government shows that the restrictions: (1) are jus- <br />tified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) <br />are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; <br />and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication <br />of the information. <br />Here, the court found the identification signs allowed under the <br />city's zoning code were an example of "context- specific signs." "Such <br />signs clearly better convey their information at the location they are <br />intended to identify, rendering them similar to address signs." The <br />court explained that context - specific signs do not constitute content - <br />based restrictions. The court said this was because allowing such <br />"context- sensitive signs" while banning others is "not discriminat- <br />ing in favor of the content of th[ose] signs; rather it is accommodat- <br />ing the special nature of such signs so that the messages they contain <br />have an equal chance to be communicated." Thus, the court analyzes <br />their First Amendment validity under the content- neutral test. <br />Here, the court found that the ordinance was valid under the con- <br />tent- neutral test because: (1) the city had important aesthetic interest <br />in limiting advertising signage and important interest in allowing the <br />public to identify a particular name with a geographic location —pub- <br />lic order and traffic safety; and (2) the ordinance was narrowly tai- <br />lored to serve those interests, by allowing for a small number of iden- <br />tification signs containing advertising when they also identified their <br />locations, and "impinging as little as possible" on the overall goal of <br />the city's sign regulations. <br />Finally, the court concluded that "Melrose's signs clearly failed to <br />satisfy [the four criteria applied by the zoning board]." Accordingly, <br />it upheld the zoning board's rejection of Melrose's sign applications. <br />4 © 2010 Thomson Reuters <br />
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