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Z.B. February 10, 2000 N Page 5
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<br /> Young replaced the American flag with the "Jolly Roger," a flag depicting
<br />a skull and crossbones that supposedly flew over pirate ships.' Young's flag
<br />also had the name of his law fLrm and his areas of practice.
<br /> The city told Young his new flag was considered a sign subject to regula-
<br />tion under city ordinances. As such, it'needed a permit.
<br /> The ordinance stated "a sign is a ri.amc' identificatiOn,'desCription.., which
<br />directs attention to an.' Object, product, place, activity, iaefson, institUtion, orga-
<br />nization, or business." Banners'w~re defined as "attenfiofi getting devices of
<br />various shapes, sizes, and colors' that'tyPically are made of a paper, cloth, or
<br />plasti.c material." Fi9. ally, flags were defined as "cloth bi' buntha, g Varying in
<br />color and design, used as a symbol, sta.fi..'i dard, emblem, or insignia identifying a
<br />governmental agency or any civic; cha~i.. 'table, religious, institUtional, patriotic,
<br />corporate, fraternal, Or similar Organization, [or] flags [of]foreign nations hav-
<br />ing diplomatie'relatiofis with the United Statbs."" .... ' ....
<br />Roseville's code coordinator demed Young s permit'applicati0n. The code
<br />coordinator concluded the Jolly R°ge[ was ~a'sign' Or` banner, and not a flag.
<br />Under city ordinances, banners.-.'eould be b'atmed and signs were subject to
<br />regulation. ' -'t. "
<br /> Young then asked the city ff he cot~ld fly the Jolly Roger without any text.
<br />The code coordinator again denied yo.Ung's permit application.
<br /> Young sued, clmmmg the ordinance s defimtions .were unconst~tUtaonally
<br />content-based. The city argued the ordinance was a permissible regulation of
<br />commercial speech, j
<br />DECISION: Judgment for Young. i~
<br /> The display of flags could constitfite, expressive conduct protected under
<br />the First Amendment. | - -. : "'
<br /> The city's ordinance classified na,t~onal flags :as expressive and noncom-
<br />mercial in nature. However, nati6nal flags were lumped together with flags
<br />that were clearly corrimercial in natu?e[ The city acknowledged a flag bearing
<br />a corporate symbol could be floyd/perrmt-free. The city,s ordinance drew no
<br />distinction between noncornrn~rciaI/ex}ressive speech and commercial speech.
<br /> Signs. .and banners.. ,were .s. imilar!y.',regulat .ed. Fpr example, the ordinance
<br />drew no distinction be .twe. e..n a.banner p~rote, sting zon. i.ng'0rdinances and a'ban-
<br />ner advertising a mall. ~
<br />The city stated concern for'aeSffieficS and traffic sa{'ety was behind the regu-
<br />lation. But the ordin.anbe, regu. lating both co. romercial and noncommercial ex-.
<br />pression, had no clear relationship to this concern. Because the ordinance re~
<br />stricted expression without a sufficient justification and contained imprecise
<br />distinctions, it was unconstithtior/al. · ':' '
<br />Citation: Young v. Cit~ of R6$eville, 'U.S. District Court for the District of
<br />Minne'sota, No. 99-CV-1515(JMR/FLN) (1999). "
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<br />see also: 'Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 39..7 (1989). '
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<br />see also: City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
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