Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/05/2011

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Zoning Bulletin March 25, 2011 1 Volume 5 J No. 6 large congregation. It sought to build a new church facility on certain industrial land that it purchased in the city (the "Property"). ICFG's Property was located in the city's Industrial Park ("IP") zoning district. It was also situated in an area set aside in the city's General Plan "to preserve an environment for industrial and technological activity." The city's zoning code (the "Zoning Code") did not allow in the IP district or other industrial or commercial district of the city: "assembly uses," which included churches and private non-profit clubs, lodges, and organizations. "Assembly uses" were only allowed in: Residential districts, provided the assembly use obtained a conditional use permit ("CUP") or "IP (AU) with Assembly Use Overlay" districts. ICFG applied to the city for: (1) a rezoning of the Property from IP to "IP (AU) with Assembly Use Overlay"; and (2) a CUP for a proposed as- sembly use at the Property under the existing IP zoning. The city's Planning Commission denied ICFG's rezoning application. It did so because it found that ICFG's Property did not meet two criteria of eight that it used in determining suitability of properties for AU Over- lay designation. The Planning Commission also denied ICFG's CUP ap- plication because of "inconsistency with the zoning and additional fac- tors such as inadequate parking." ICFG appealed both denials. The City Council also denied both applications. ICFG appealed to district court. ICFG argued that the city's denial of ICFG's rezoning and CUP applications violated the substantial burden provision of the federal RLUIPA. RLUIPA provides that a government land -use regulation "that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a ... religious assembly or institution" is unlawful "unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden ... is in fur- therance of a compelling government interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest." Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute and deciding the matter on the law alone, the district court granted summary judg- ment in favor of the city. The court concluded that the city's denial of ICFG's rezoning and CUP applications did not violate the substantial burden provision of RLUIPA. ICFG again appealed. DECISION: Reversed, and matter remanded. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that the dis- trict court erred in holding that: (1) as a matter of law, the city's actions did not impose a substantial burden on ICFG's exercise of religion with- in the meaning of RLUIPA; and (2) the city's claimed need to preserve properties for industrial use qualified as a compelling governmental in- terest as a matter of law. © 2011 Thomson Reuters 3