Agenda - Planning Commission - 03/02/1999

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Page 6 -- February 10, 1999 z.g. that parking commercial vehicles in residential areas was a public nuisance -- was unreasonable. Parked vehicles generally didn't cause increased air or noise pollution, nor did they seriously endanger children 6'i' 'other pedestrians, be- cause they were parked. Operatb~g commercial vehicl~..might increase these dangers, but the city chose to regulate parked vel-iicles~,' riot operating vehicles. Moreover, Skilwies proved he was entitled to p. ark his 'd~mptruck on his property as a nonconforming use based solely on the city's new ordinance -- he didn't have to otherwise prove he had a legal right to do so. The new ordi- nance must have made illegal uses that had been legal before it was enacted, including parking commercial vehicles in residential areas otherwise, the ordinance would have been meaningless. see also: Franchise Developers Inc. v. Cincinnati, 505 N.E. 2d 966 (1987). see also: Petti v. Richmond Heights, 449 N.E. 2d 768 (1983). Nonconforming Use Didzoning board properly classify sawmill activities as 'lumbering'? Citation: Hardy v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Powhatan County, Supreme Court of Virginia, No. 980407 (1999) Shortridge owned property in Powhatan County, Va. The property was zoned agricultural, which meant lumbering was a permitted use. Shortridge had a one-year conditional use permit to operate a portable saw- mill. He renewed the permit for a five-year period. After the permit expired, Shortridge asked the zoning administrator to de- fine the word "lumbering" in the zoning ordinance to include his sawmill ac- tivities. The administrator denied his request, finding his activities - - which included cutting and sawing logs from other property -- didn't constitute lum- bering. She said "lumbering" was the business of cutting or getting timber or logs from the forest for lumber. .. Shortridge appealed to the zoning, appeals board, which reversed the administrator's decision, It found Shortridge's activities did constitute lumber- ing, so they were permitted in the agricultural zone. ~ Hardy and other neighbors sued the board. Shortridge asked to intervene. Soon after, the county amended its zoning ordinance. Lumbering was re- moved as a permitte, d.u.se in the area, and timber harvesting -- which could include sawmills used only for cutting timber harvested on site w was added. The zoning board asked the court to dismiss Hardy's appeal as moot. It said Sh0/-tridge's activities were now a permitted nonconforming use. Hardy ar- gued that whether Shortridge's activities could continue depended on whether the board correctly interpreted the former ordinance wwhich had yet to be decided. The court dismissed the case, and Hardy appealed. DECISION: Reversed and returned to the lower court. Whether the zoning board properly found Shortridge's activities constituted "lumbering" had to be decided.