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Z.B. June 10, 1999 -- Page 3 <br /> <br /> subject to regulations that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommer- <br /> cial speech. There was no question Schultz's commercial speech was lawful, <br /> and her sign wasn't misleading. It was also clear, though, that the city had a <br /> legitimate interest in regulating commercial signs to maintain the nature and <br /> character of residential neighborhoods. <br /> The appeals court undervalued the relationship between the city's goals <br /> and the ban on home-occupation signs. There was no doubt that signs or bill- <br /> boards on a person's property, by their very nature, could be considered an <br /> aesthetic harm. Unlike oral speech, signs took up space and obstructed views, <br /> distracted motorists, displaced alternative uses for land, and posed other legiti- <br /> mate problems. The city wasn't concerned about the content of the message on <br /> commercial signs; it was concerned about the visual characteristics of such <br /> signs. The city left open ample means for home business owners to pass their <br /> commercial messages on to consumers by advertising, sending direct mail, or <br /> having a sign in a commercial area. <br /> The city's ordinance didn't have to be the least restrictive means to achieve <br />its interest, which meant the city didn't have to prohibit all signs from residen- <br />tial areas to support the ban on commercial signs. The types of signs the city <br />allowed in residential areas were consistent with the character of residential <br />neighborhoods, and were different from home occupation signs because they <br />were either noncommercial, informational in nature (such as street signs), or <br />temporary signs (such as garage sale or real estate signs). <br /> <br />City of Rochester Hills v. Schultz, Supreme Court of Michigan, No. 110294 <br />(1999). <br /> <br />see also: Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission <br />of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 &Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1980). <br /> <br />see also: Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 <br />L.Ed. 2d 800 (1981). <br /> <br />Conditional Use m Company wants to house tigers, cougars, and leopards <br />in agriculture zone <br /> <br />MINNESOTA (4/20/99) -- The Center For Endangered Cats ,,vas a for-profit <br />provider of exotic cats, such as tigers, cougars, and leopards, for educational <br />and entertainment purposes. The cats appeared in lectures, theme parks, sports <br />shows, and television programs. The number of cats housed on the premises <br />varied, and at times, the Center had as many as 25 cats. <br /> The Center had operated since 1989, but in 1996, it moved to a rural, agri- <br />culturally zoned part of Forest Lake Township. The Center's owners thought <br />the use was permitted because one of the permitted uses in agricultural zones <br />was "Animals--Commercial Training." <br /> The township disagreed and told the Center it had to apply for a condi- <br />tional use permit allowing it to operate as a nature center. The Center applied <br /> <br />5/ <br /> <br /> <br />