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Page 4 -- June 25, I999 Z.B. <br /> <br /> The city was correct in that the "rough proportionality" test, which consid- <br /> ered whether dedications demanded as conditions of development were pro- <br /> portional to the development's anticipated impacts, didn't apply where the <br /> challenge was based on denial of development. This was irrelevant, however, <br /> because although the appeals court considered the rough proportionality test, <br /> the jury didn't. <br /> The developers were entitled to a jury trial on their takings claim. The question <br />of whether a land use decision advanced a legitimate public interest was a <br />mixed question of fact that might, but not always, be appropriate for a jury. But <br />in this case, the narrow question for the jury was whether, considering the <br />protracted history of the application process, the city's decision was reason- <br />ably related to its justifications--"which was essentially fact-bound in nature." <br /> The city's decision was irrational. The city claimed the developers didn't <br />provide adequate access even though they had twice changed the plans to com- <br />ply with the city's access demands. It claimed the development would damage <br />the environment even though'the location was required by the city's demands. <br />Finally, the city claimed the plan would disrupt the natural habitat of the Smith's <br />Blue Butterfly even though the plan would restore buckwheat habitat on al- <br />most half of the property -- and even though only one. larva had ever been <br />found on the property. <br />Citation: City of Mo~terey v. Del Mot~te Dunes at Monterey Ltd., Sul2reme <br />Court of the United States, No. 97~2235 (1999). <br />see also: Williamson County Regio~al?lanning Commissio~ v. Hamilto~ Ba~zk <br />of Johnson Cio~, 473 U.S. J72, 105 S. Ct. 3208, 87L.Ed. 2d 126 (1985). <br />see also: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, ~t14 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed. 2d <br />304 (1994). <br /> <br />Code Violation ~ Township says lawn tractors qualify as 'motor <br />vehicles' <br /> <br />PENNSYLVANIA (5/6/99) -- Kissell leased property in a commercial district <br />in Ferguson Township. He ran a retail business that sold and rented lawn, gar- <br />den, and recreational equipment. Some of his products, including riding and <br />self-propelled lawn mowers and lawn tractors, were displayed outside the build- <br />ing in the property's front setback ~:ea. <br /> The township's zoning officer sent Kissell an enforccmcnt notice stating <br />he was displaying "motor vehicles" in violation of the township zoning ordi- <br />nance, which prohibited displaying or storing "motor vehicles" in setback ar- <br />eas. The zoning officer ordered IGssell to stop violating the ordinance and to <br />bring the property into compliance within one month. <br /> Kissell appealed the enforcement fiotice to the zoning appeals board, argu- <br />ing self-propelled lawn mowers and lawn tractors weren't "motor vehicles." <br />He also sought a variance that would allow him to display those items in the <br />setback area. <br /> <br /> <br />