Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/06/1998

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Page 6 L. November 25, 1997 Z.B. line as measured from the front corner of the lot. The county's planning department rejected the altered building plan. The developer appealed to the zoning board of appeals, which approved the redesign. The board found that bec:rose the total distance between the two houses was greater than 10 feet, the plat requirement was satisfied. Despite the board's adoption of the developer's desired meaning of "roof line to roof line," the developer appealed to court. She .asked the court to rule on the ordinance's meaning. The court found that the ordinance allowed the interpretation that the board adopted. Cleland appealed the board's decision in a separate lawsuit. She too asked the court to interpret the ordinance, and added claims for attorney fees for stubborn litigiousness and damages to the value of her property. She also sought a court order prohibiting the county from issuing a certificate of occupancy for the developer's house. The county and the developer asked for judgment without a trial, arguing Cleland's appeal was barred by the "estoppel" doctrine. Estoppel prohibited the relitigation of a matter that was actually decided in a former case. It was available only when the subsequent lawsuit was between the same parties. The county and the developer relied on an earlier case in which the court stated, "where the interest of the [landowner] is identical to that of a governmental body ... who is a named party, it will be assumed that the [landowner'si interests are adequately represented" by the governmental body, absent a concrete showing of circumstances that make the representation inad- equate. The county and the developer argued the county had represented Cleland's interest in the first appeal. The court awarded the county and the developer judgment without a trial on the ground that the earlier court decision, rendered on the developer's appeal, prevented Cleland from asserting a different interpretation of the plat requirement or ordinance. Cleland appealed. The county and the developer argued Cleland's appeal was moot because the county had already issued a certificate of occupancy for the developer's house and the house had been sold to a third party. DECISION: Reversed. The lower court's earlier judgment, rendered on the developer's appeal, didn't bar Cleland from asserting a different interpretation of the plat requirement. Nor was Cleland's appeal moot when the county issued a certificate of occupancy for the developer's house. By its very language, the case cited by the county and the developer applied only when the interests of the governmental body and the landowner were identical. In the prior appeal, the county advocated the same interpretation of the plat as the developer. The county didn't advocate the interpretation Cleland sought so their interests were not "identical." As Cleland championed a materially different interpretation, the county didn't adequately represent her interests, so her appeal wasn't barred by estoppel.