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Z.B. December 10, 1997 -- Page 3 <br /> <br /> DECISION: Reversed; judgment for Banks and the city. <br /> Banks had absolute legislative immunity for introducing and voting on the <br /> rezoning ordinance and for requesting a continuance of the board's hearing. <br /> That Banks knew the church had contracted to buy the property had no impact <br /> on his immunity. <br /> Absolute immunity shielded a legislator's conduct even when that conduct <br /> was based on improper motives. When acting collectively to pursue the public <br /> good through legislation, legislators must be free to represent their constituents <br /> "without fear of outside interference" that would result in private lawsuits. Any <br /> restriction on a legislator's freedom undermined the public good by interfering <br /> with the rights of the people to representation in the democratic process. <br /> Introducing and voting on legislation were elements of the legislative <br /> process. A person engaged in such an act was entitled to absolute immunity. If <br /> legislators feared they would be subject to civil liability for their attempts to <br /> introduce new legislation or propose amendments, government would become <br /> stagnant -- changes would not be considered, let alone made. <br /> Absolute immunity didn't depend on the number of people that a law hap- <br />pened to affect at the time of its passage. Although the initial effect of the <br />zoning ordinance impacted only the church, the ordinance was a neutral, <br />prospective rule that applied equally to all current and future owners of the <br />property. Although the organization had agreed to buy the proper~y, it had no <br />vested right to use the property for a church. Such a use required a special use <br />permit, and there was no guarantee it would have gotten one. <br /> Even if Banks had not asked the board for a continuance, there was no <br />guarantee the church would have received a special use permit. Property owners <br />had no right to special use permits. The board, in its discretion, granted the <br />continuances. The request to continue the hearings was inextricably intertwined <br />with the legislative process of introducing and voting on the zoning ordinances <br />and could not be separated from those legislative functions. <br /> see also: Thillens Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Association of <br />Illinois Inc., 729 F. 2d 1128 (1984). <br /> see also: Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). <br /> <br />Editor's Note: The court's decision also included an appeal by another city <br />alderman. He had initiated a similar ordinance preventing a church from buying <br />property and using it as a church in his ward. The outcome was identical for <br />both appeals. <br /> <br />Adult Entertainment-- Ordinance gives exotic dancing establishment six <br />years to find new location <br /> Restaura~t Ro~v Associates v. Horr), CottnO', 489 S.E. 2d 641 (South <br /> Carolina) 2997 <br /> Thee Dollhouse was an exotic dancing establishment. When it opened in <br />i988, it conformed to the current county zoning ordinance. That ordinance <br /> <br /> <br />