Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/03/1998

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; Z.B. December 24, 1997 Page 5 From 1984 through 1991, Tigard's quarry use was interrupted. In addition, the use was abandoned for two of those years. The interruption and abandonment each provided a separate basis for holding Tigard to current zoning regulations. Tigard's quarry wasn't like the one Tigard used to support its position: It had not operated sporadically before 1984. Rather, operations were normally active and ongoing. The lull from 1984 through 1991 wasn't typical for Tigard, so it constituted an interruption. Moreover, the conversion to a wood-processing business provided a second basis for the hearing officer's and the board's decisions. The nonconforming quarry use was abandoned when Tigard started using the property for an entirely different type of business. see also: Polk County v. Martin, 636 P. 2d 952 (1982). Waste DisPosal -- Judge denies condo association permit for dumpster Foster v. Mayor's Agent for Historic Preservation, 698 A.2d 411 (District of Columbia) 1997 The Capital House Condominium wanted to install a trash dumpster and recycling bins on public property in Washington, D.C. It planned to surround the dumpster and bins with a wooden fence. The condominium was located in an historic district, which was ;ubject to the Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978. The Act, designed to preserve the sightliness and historic integrity of historic districts, placed restrictions on any plans to "alter the exterior or site of ... a building or structure in an historic district." Foster applied (on behalf of the condominium) for a permit to install the dumpster, bins, and fence. The application requested permission to install a 4- foot concrete pad as a base for the dumpster and to surround the dumpster and bins with a permanent fence. An administrative law judge, acting as the mayor's agent for historic p~'eservation, denied Foster's application. The judge found the proposed dumpster and bins would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. He also concluded Foster's application didn't meet the "special merit" requirements of the local code and Foster didn't demonstrate "unreasonable economic hardship" would result from a permit denial. Foster appealed, arguing the Act didn't apply to her request. She also argued the Act didn't define "historic character" and that it appeared to mean anything the members of the historic preservation board wanted it to mean. DECISION: Affirmed. The judge's denial of the permit was reasonable. The Act applied to Foster's request. Foster requested to alter the site of a building in an historic district. The judge's determination that granting the permit would be inconsistent with preserving the sightliness and historic integrity of historic districts was reasonable. It was reasonable to conclude building a 4-foot concrete pad in a