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i: Z.B. December 24, 1997 -- Page 7 <br /> <br /> The city could amend its zoning ordinance under its police powers whenever <br /> it determined circumstances and conditions warranted such changes. In this <br /> case, the setback restriction served no purpose when applied to properties <br /> bounded by abandondd streets. For this reason, the city council found it in the <br /> best interests of the public to amend the definition of comer lots. This decision <br /> clearly rested in the sound discretion of the council. <br /> The amendment was not arbitrary and did not singularly benefit the <br /> ' Lauridsens. It applied to all properties in the city, including a number of other <br /> properties bounded by abandoned roads. <br /> The Shrivers were not entitled to damages based on the anticipated <br /> construction of a garage on the Lauridsens' property. They had no right to an <br /> unobstructed view across a private lot that complied with all applicable zoning <br /> restrictions and setback lines. . <br /> see also: Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N. W. 2d 159 (1985). <br /> see also: Mohr v. Midas Realty Corp., 431 N.W. 2d 380 (1988). <br /> <br /> Notice -- Did citizens' appeal of board's decision meet state notice <br /> requirements? <br /> Ray v. Douglas .County, 941 P.2d 558 (Oregon) 1997 <br /> The Yards sought approval from Douglas County, Ore., to operate a recreation- <br /> al vehicle campground. The county granted the Yards a conditional use permit. <br /> Ray and other neighbors challenged the county's decision to grant the permit. <br /> The county's Land Use Board of Appeals sent the issue back to the county for <br /> reconsideration. It notified Ray and the others of its decision by mail on Feb. 6, <br /> 1997. Later, believing it forgot to notify all the parties involved, the board <br /> again sent notice of its decision on Feb. 12. Ray received both mailings. <br /> Ray asked a court to review the board's decision. Under state law, such <br />appeals had to be filed within "21 days following the date [the board] delivered <br />or mailed the order [being appealed]." Ray filed an appeal on Feb..27 m 21 <br />days after he received the Feb. 6 notice. <br /> State law also required that parties seeking court review notify the opposing <br />party "by registered or certified mail" within the 21-day time limit. Ray sent <br />the Yards (the opposing party) notification by ordinary mail. The Yards received <br />it Feb. 28 -- 22 days after Ray received the board's Feb. 6 notice. <br /> The county asked the court to dismiss Ray's appeal, arguing Ray failed to <br />notify the Yards within the time limit. Ray objected. He claimed the time limit <br />didn't start tO run until Feb. 12, the date of the board's second mailing. <br />DECISION: Appeal dismissed. <br /> Ray failed to comply with the state's notice requirement, so he could not <br />appeal the board's decision. <br /> Ray had 21 days to notify the Yards of his appeal, starting from the date he <br />got the board's first letter. That the board twice notified Ray of its decision <br />didn't change the fact that Ray knew about the decision Feb. 6. He had until <br />Feb. 27 to notify the Yards of his appeal. The Yards received notice on Feb. 28, <br /> <br /> <br />