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Page 2 January 10, 1998 Z.B. <br /> <br /> First Amendment-- City bans ali home office signs on single-family homes <br /> City of Rochester Hills v. Shultz, 568 N. W. 2d 832 (Michiga~O 1997 <br /> Schultz owned a house ~in a single-family zone in the city of Rochester <br /> Hills, Mich. She sold beauty products from her home, and hung a large sign <br /> from a tree on her front lawn to advertise her merchandise and solicit distributors. <br /> A city ordinance allowed homeowners to conduct home occupations at their <br /> residences subject to limitations, one of which was that the business didn't <br /> "cause the erection or maintenance of any signs." Homeowners, churches, and <br /> businesses could, however, post in single-family areas: signs at entrances of <br /> subdivisions; real estate development signs; signs inviting the public to tour <br /> model homes; signs containing street numbers and the owner's name; danger <br /> signs; flags of any state or nation; signs bearing any message posted inside <br /> windows; signs indicating the date of erection of buildings; political signs; and <br /> garage sale signs. <br /> The city issued Shultz a ticket for erecting a sign in violation of the home <br /> occupation ordinance. Shultz asked the court to dismiss the ticket, arguing the <br /> ordinance was an unconstitutional prohibition of commercial speech. <br /> Both the city and Shultz "agreed Schultz's sign deserved constitutional <br /> protection because it concerned a commercial activity and wasn't misleading. <br /> They also agreed the city's asserted interests -- in maintaining the nature and <br /> character of residential neighborhoods by permitting "only minimal, inciden- <br /> tal, non-disruptive commercial activity within residential zones" and maintain- <br /> ing "aesthetics, property values and traffic safety by keeping residential <br /> neighborhoods free of visual clutter"--were substantial government interests. <br /> This meant the city had to prove its ban on home occupation signs directly <br />advanced its interests in maintaining the character, nature, aesthetic quality, <br />property values, and safety of residential areas. <br /> The city argued the ban on home occupations signs directly advanced its <br />interests "by permitting only minimal, incidental, non-disruptive commercial <br />activity within residential zones." The city also claimed the ordinance was a <br />content-neutral, reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction on protected <br />speech and was therefore constitutional. <br /> The court agreed with Shultz, ruling the city could regulate, but not flatly <br />prohibit, home occupation signs. It dismissed the complaint against Shultz, holding <br />the ordinance was an impermissible restriction on protected commercial speech. <br /> The city appealed. <br />DECISION: Affirmed. <br /> The court properly dismissed the charge against Schultz. The ordinance was an <br />unconstitutional, content-based restriction on protected commercial speech. <br /> The city failed to prove its ban on home occupation signs directly advanced <br />its interests in maintaining the character, aesthetic quality, and safety of <br />residential areas. By banning signs advertising home occupations, the city had <br />not ensured that commercial activity within its residential zones would be <br />minimal, incidental, or non-disruptive. The ban did nothing to stem the growth <br /> <br />.67 <br /> <br /> <br />