Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/02/1998

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Page 4 -- October 10, 1998 Z.B. The court denied Baby Tam's requested order, finding the ordinance wasn't an unconstitutional prior restraint. Baby Tam appealed. DECISION: Reversed, and returned to the trial court. The trial court had to issue an order permanently preventing the city from enforcing the bookstore ordinance so long as the ordinance failed to provide for a prompt hearing and decision by a court in the event the city denied a license. Even though the ordinance didn't completely ignor~ an applicant's right to have a court review a license denial, the ordinance was still an unconstitutional prior restraint. The ordinance allowed Baby Tam to apply for a court order, but it didn't require a hearing or a decision on the appeal within a prescribed period. Without such provisions, the licensing ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review of denied applications. The appeals court determined that "prompt judicial review" meant "the opportunity for a prompt hearing and a prompt decision bY a judicial officer." The city's ordinance didn't require a hearing; whether to hold a hearing was at the court's discretion. Without the right to a hearing, an applicant had no right to have a license denial "reviewed." And without the right to a decision, the most exhaustive review by 'a court would be worthless. "In baseball terms it would be like throwing a pitch and not getting a call.'" see also.'. Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 E3d 1309 (1993). Taking -- Owners seek compensation for six.month closure of their motel Citation: City of Miami v. Keshbro Inc., Court of Appeal of Florida, 3rd Dist., No. 98-1151 (1998) · .In 1988, Keshbro Inc. and Gihwala (owners) bought the 57-unit Stardust Motel in Miami. The property had a long history of drug and prostitution activ- ity, and in 1992, the city's nuisance abatement board ordered the motel closed. The motel reopened in 1993, after, the owners agreed to 'keep the premises drug- and prostitution-free. 'The city's efforts to stop the drugs and prostitution failed, and in 1996, the board held a hearing to determine whether the motel constituted a public nuisance. The owners agreed not to contest a finding that the motel was a nuisance, and the board agreed to order.only six rooms temporarily closed. Despite the agreement, the drug and prostitution problems continued, and the board ordered seven more rooms closed for six months. This didn't resolve the problem, and the list of illegal incidents grew longer. Eventually, the board ordered the entire property closed for six months. The city got a court order to enforce the board's closure order. The owners sued the city for damages, claiming the complete closure of their motel was a taking because it temporarily deprived them of all economic use of their property. The owners claimed a total regulatory taking of property required compensation so long as the property was being used in a legal fasb-