Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/07/2011

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May 25, 2011 I Volume 5 I No. 10 Zoning Bulletin The court found that the City's predominate concerns in adopt- ing the amendments to § 14.01 were with the secondary effects of adult businesses. The City had reviewed at least 49 studies and re- ports concerning the secondary effects of adult businesses before enacting the October 2005 amendments. Those reports were also valid for the March 2006 amendments. As well, the City council's minutes contained discussions about limiting secondary effects. The court thus concluded that the amendments to § 14.01 were content - neutral for purposes of the court's analysis. The court also found that the ordinance was constitutionally val- id in that it was designed to serve a substantial government interest and allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Big Dipper had argued that § 14.01 was too broad in geographic scope —leaving too few sites available for adult businesses in the city. The court said the available sites would be adequate so long as. the ordinance gave Big Dipper a "reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult [business] within the [City]." Whether that was the case, said the court, depended on the facts of the case, not necessarily on set percentages or formulas. Here, the court found that the amendments left reasonable alter- native avenues of communication for Big Dipper since 27 sites in the City remained available for an adult business and only two ap- plications for adult businesses had been filed in the City during the preceding five years. The court concluded: "A supply of sites more than 13 times greater than the five-year demand [was] more than ample for constitutional purposes." The ordinance allowed for rea- sonable alternative avenues of communication. See also: City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1721 (1986). Case Note: Big Dipper had argued that city council members were hostile to adult businesses and that hostility was a moti- vating factor in enacting the ordinance. The court noted that such motivation was "not sufficient to trigger heightened scru- tiny of this type of ordinance." Case Note: Big Dipper had also argued that the City violated the First Amendment —by imposing a prior restraint on Big Dip- per's speech —when the City took 24 days, rather than 20 as pre- scribed by the City's rules, to reject Big Dipper's application. The court disagreed. It found that the City taking 24 days rather than 20 to act on Big Dipper's application was "immaterial for consti- 4 © 2011 Thomson Reuters