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- - Page 8 SEPTEMBER 1996 Petitioner filed an application for the assessment year at issue with the H. ennepin County Assessor for valuation and tax deferment under the Minnesota agricultural property tax law (Minn. Stat. § 273.111), commonly known as the "Green Acres" law. On the application, Petitioner stated that he received $3,200 of gross income from the agricultural use of the property by selling hay. Petitioner does not mention any other agricultural use on the application. Petitioner's application was denied and he petitions this denial. At issue is whether the subject property containing the Petitioner's homestead was "primarily used" for agricultural purposes as of January 2, 1994 to be classified agricultural under Minn. Stat. § 273.13, subd. 23(c) before it can qualify for Green Acres treatment under Minn. Stat. § 273.111. The Minnesota Supreme Court established this standard in 1992 to determine classification i~sues. Barren v. Hennepin County, 488 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1992). According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, this "primary use" test: incorporated in Minn. Stat. § 273.13, subd. 23(c) implies an examination of the specific nature of the property and the use or multiple uses to which that property has been put, together with a subjective balancing of those relative uses. Barren, 488 N.W.2d at 293. Petitioner argues that the property qualifies for an agricultural classification based on the magnitude of Petitioner's agricultural uses and Petitioner's significant investment in those uses. During trial, Petitioner and his wife testified that they are in the business of raising race horses and they have invested substantial amounts in their horse business.~ In addition to the sale of hay listed on Petitioner's Green Acres application, Petitioner also testified that he has planted some 200 walnut trees on the subject property. Neither the horse breeding business nor the walnut trees generated any income. The County counters that Petitioner relies upon facts that did not exist as of the assessment date at issue. Furthermore, the County states that even if the facts did exist at the relevant time, the only income generated from agricultural use is from the sale of the hay. This income, the County maintains, is insignificant when compared to the value of the homestead. We agree. '"rhe record reflects that Petitioner and his wife have invested approximately $250,000 since 1992 in her horse racing business. We note, however, that most of this "investment" is reflected on Schedule C of Petitioner's federal income tax returns under "depreciation and section 179 expense" deduction~. Petitioner has also purchased adjoining land subsequent to the assessment year at issue, which we de not f'md relevant for this matter. Petitioner also apparently purchased a tractor but it is not clear for what purpose, when it was purchased or how much [t cost. No authority exists that suggests that amounts Petitioner has "invested" should be considered and compared to the value of the homestead under the Barren test. Petitioner relies upon two cases that were decided before Barren: Walthall v. County of Wadena, File No. 9843 (Minn. Tax Ct. Mar. 20, 1985); and Hallgren v. County of Carver, File No. 17606 (Minn. Tax Ct. Jan. 27, 1982). We do not read Walihall or Hallgren to support Petitioner's position. In fact, this Court denied agricultural classification in Walthall despite the taxpayer's large investment in a Canadian geese game farm because there was no significant' income from the agricultural use of the land. In Hallgren, on the other hand, this Court granted agricultural classification to taxpayers who invested large amounts in a horse raising business by buying horse barns and corrals. We find the facts in Hallgren distinguishable from the facts in this case. In Hallgren, all three barns on the property were used to raise seven or eight horses for show and eventual sale. Moreover, all available land in Hallgren was used to pasture the horses and all the machinery was used to plant and harvest feed for the horses. Based on these facts, the Hallgren Court found that the use of the land was "given over entirely" to horses being bred and raised. Hallgren, slip op. at 3. We find the deciding factor in Hallgren in support of an agricultural classification was that the taxpayer was using the property primarily for agricultural use. Agricultural classification was not granted in Hallgre n because the taxpayer had invested a substantial amount. We do not have the Hallgren facts here. Almost all of the subject land is being used to produce hay that is sold to others, not used as feed for Petitioner's horses as in Hallgren. Moreover, Petitioner is using the other buildings on the subject property to store medical records, at least one boat and other miscellaneous items. The buildings are not dedicated or devoted to the horse business as they were in Hal~?en. Unlike the property in Hallgren, the primary use of Petitioner's property is residential, with an insignificant farming use. Petitioner's property as of January 2, 1994 was not given over entirely to raising race horses. Finally, Petitioner attempts to distinguish this case from Rasmussen v. County of Hennepin, File No. TC- 23982 (Minn. Tax Ct. April 24, 1996) where this Court classified the property as residential. Petitioner argues that the property in Rasmussen was located in a rapidly developing neighborhood while testimony here indicates that the subject is located in an equal mix of residential and agricultural properties. We do not read Rasmussen to say that the sole factor for classification purposes is the neighboring community where the property is located. We read both Rasmussen and