Agenda - Charter Commission - 10/23/1997

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Mr. William Goodrich October I3, 1997 Page 2 In responding to these questions, and particularly question (3) with regard to legislative intent, public lawyers generally review the statutory language to decide whether the legislature intended the statute to preempt the law of the municipality, whether charter or ordinance. Thus, if the statute stated that the matter was of state-wide concern, or if the statute began with the language "Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary", or if in the preamble or purpose provisions the legislature intended to make its provisions uniform, preemption is indicated. In this instance, the legislature has declared in Minn. Stat. § 362.351 that "it is the purpose of sections 462.35t to 462.364 to provide municipaliti.es, in a single body of law, with the necessary powers and a uniform procedure for adequately conducting and implementing municipal planning." The municipalities to which the legislature intended these provisions to apply includes both statutory and home-rule charter cities. See Minn. Stat. § 462.352, subd. 2. You should note that Section 14.2 of the Ramsey Charter contains no provisions on procedures for plat approval or provision dealing with subdivision regulations except for density restrictions and traffic generation analysis. On the other hand, Minnesota Statutes, Section 462.350, subdivision 3c, contains specific procedural regulations prohibiting, unless there is consent, amendments to comprehensive plans or official controls relating to "development density, lot size, [or] lot layout" during one year after preliminary approval of a plat and during two years after final plat approval. The question you have asked is whether these provisions control with respect to the Ramsey Charter Amendment. My conclusion is that they do and that during the time periods stated in the statute the charter provisions are not applicable, which, for practical purposes, means section 14.2 will not apply to these plats. The Municipal Land Planning Act not only authorizes municipalities to conduct planning activities and enact official controls, it also contains limitations on the'powers delegated. This was clearly recognized in Costle¥ v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W. 2d 21 (Minn. 1981). There neighbors sought to prevent the construction of a group home for retarded adults on residentially zoned property. The neighbors insisted that under a Two Harbors zoning ordinance unrelated persons did not constitute a family. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, citing Minn. Stats., Section 462.357, subd. 7 which establishes a state-wide policy of requiring that licensed group homes with six or fewer mentally retarded persons must be considered a single-family residential use for zoning purposes. In giving effect to the state statute, the Court stated that: "In Minnesota... a municipality has no inherent power to enact zoning regulations. A municipality receives power to zone only by legislative grant of authority by the state. Minn. Stat. § 462. 357 (1980): Denny..v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 26, 202 N.W. 2d 892, 894 (1972). In exercisin~ such a delegation of power, a .muni.cipality cannot exceed the limitations impqsecl by the enabling legislation." FBO131640 RA125-51