Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/07/1997

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Page 4 -- December 15, 1996 Z.B. DECISION: Affirmed. The county did not take NPL's property without compensation, nor did it deprive NPL of due process. When it rezoned the property, the county did not deprive NPL of its right to exclude others. The property could have remained dormant under the air- port zoning, so NPL could not say it.lost the right to exclude. Nor did the county force NPL to invite the public onto the property. In contrast to cases where a rezoning allowed only public uses (such as a school, park or sewage treatment plant), NPL was free to do business with anyone it chose. The rezon- lng did not require NPL to open its property for use by the general public. The county did not take NPL's property by physically occupying it. NPL could have let the property sit idly. As far as NPL's conspiracy theory was concerned, no evidence suggested NPL could not sue under state law to recover for the county's allegedly unlawful leasing. The lower court properly concluded the rezoning did not deprive NPL of all economically viable uses, as the property could have been used for, among other things, boat slips, a private airport or a beach club. NPL may have relied on the existing residential zoning when it bought the property, but this did not mean the county took the property when it rezoned it. The county did not take steps such as granting a permit or passing a specific resolution approving a development -- other than creating a zoning map. This was not enough to give NPL a property interest for which it was due compensation. The rezoning did not violate due process, as the evidence did not show it was arbitrary and unreasonable. The property originally was created for use as an airport, and the strip functioned as an airport before and after the rezoning. Editor's note: For more bact~ground on this case, see the following deci- sions: New PortLargo Inc. v. Mop, roe County, 985 F. 2d 1488 (1993) and 873 F. Supp. 633 (1994). Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, ]12 S.C. 2886, 120 L.Ed. 2d 798 (]992). Loretto v. Telepromj2ter Manhattan CATV Cor£., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed. 2d 868 (.1982). Variance --.Tax-sale buyers challenge restrictions imposed before they bought lot Rei~ki;~g v. Metro]volitan £oard of Zoni~g A]2£eals of Marion County, 672 N.£.2d ]37 (I~diana) 2996 Lot 244, a corner lot in an Indianapolis subdivision, was originally plat- ted with about 15,000 square feet but was reduced to about 8,500 square feet after the state took part of. it to build a highway. After the highway was built, the city adopted a new zoning ordinance that governed the lot. The Reinkings bought the lot at a tax sale and asked the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals for setback variances (20 and 35 feet instead of the required 25 and 50 feet). They also asked for a variance from the minimum- lot-size requirement.