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requirement helps to ensure that the property's primary use is
<br />residential. Onsite residency prevents the landowner from
<br />converting the property into a business use. Ifa landowner does
<br />not reside on the premises, ir ma), be found that the home
<br />occupation is not secondary to the primary use of the propers3,
<br />for residential purposes.
<br />
<br /> Nonresident Employee Prohibitions
<br />Some home occupation provisions contain specific limitations
<br />on the status and number of employees that may be employed
<br />by a home-based occupation. Obviously, such a limitation
<br />depends on the language of the applicable ordinance. Some
<br />ordinances may prohibit employment altogether or state such a
<br />restriction as a prohibition against "employment of anyone in
<br />the home other than the dwelling occupant." [City o/Pekin v.
<br />Kaminski, 155 III.App.3d 826, 508 N.E.2d 776 (19879.] Most
<br />ordinances, however, allow for limited employment of workers
<br />in connection with the hom. e occupation. Most of these impose
<br />a residency requirement on all workers, and some additionally
<br />requite that the employees be family members who reside on the
<br />premises. Some ordinances will permit employment of
<br />nonresident workers, but they usually Jimit their number.
<br /> No matter which type of employment provision is contained in
<br />the ordinance, this condition may determine whether the home
<br />occupation is valid. For example, in a Missouri case, St. Louis
<br />County v. Kienzle, 844 S.W.2d 118 (Mo. App. 19929, the court
<br />found that the landowners' operation of an insurance and bonding
<br />business was, for the most part, not at odds with the definition of
<br />home occupation. There was no sign or any other display indicat-
<br />ing that a business was being conducted inside the home, no
<br />clients went to the residence to conduct business, and no products
<br />or goods in trade were sold from the premises. Nevertheless, the
<br />court was compelled to conclude that the landowners' employ-
<br />ment of two nieces who did not live on the premises violated the
<br />ordinance's home occupation employment limitation, which
<br />allowed employment of only resident family members.
<br />When it is unclear whether a particular home occupation
<br />accessory use is permitted under the terms of the local zoning
<br />
<br />ordinance, the landowner and municipality ma), be forced to
<br />resolve their conflicting opinions through litigation, To avoid this
<br />costly alternative, municipalities must do their best to spell out
<br />clearly the standards the3, will use to eYaluate home occupations.
<br />
<br />Calling on
<br />the Militia
<br />
<br />James Dacey is fighting for his home. A New York appeals
<br />court has ordered him to remove his mobile home from his land
<br />because it violates the town zoning laws of Perry, New York.
<br />But he refuses to do so, and the state is charging him $50 a day
<br />until he complies.
<br /> In 1992, Dacey applied for a permit at a zoning board of
<br />appeals hearing, requesting permission to replace his existing
<br />mobile home with a larger unit. His application was denied.
<br />Dacey's home on Van Valkenburg Road is on land zoned
<br />agricultural/residential, which allows one- and two-family units.
<br />Dacey claims that there are other mobile homes in this area that
<br />do not comply with town zoning laws but are allowed to remain.
<br />He then applied for a use variance, asking to become an
<br />exception to the law, and that application was also denied. The
<br />court ruled that Dacey was unable to demonstrate that he would
<br />suffer an "economic hardship" if he were denied the variance.
<br /> Dacey appealed and was granted a rehearing. At the
<br />reheazlng, no further information was brought forth, and he
<br />was again denied the application. In supporting the zoning
<br />board of appeals decision, the trial court ruled that Dacey had
<br />to remove his home within 60 days. He sought appeal in the
<br />appellate division, where he was ordered to remove the home
<br />within 30 days or face a $50 daily fine.
<br /> In an effort to rally support behind his cause, Dacey has
<br />contacted local and national militia groups including the
<br />Michigan Militia and the Chemung County Militia. Other
<br />militia groups throughout the country have also rallied to help
<br />Dacey keep his home.
<br />
<br />Finding Home Occupational Use Valid '
<br /> · Winnie v. O'Brien, 171A.D.2d997, 567N. Y.S. 2d943 (S. Ct.
<br />
<br /> · 19919 Ordinance d6ffnition of home occupation was broad, general
<br /> one that included installation of dental chair).
<br />* Ci~yofWhiteJ~talns v. DerUvo, 159A.D.2d534, 552N. ES. 2d
<br /> 399 (S. Ct. 19909 (use o/residence in connection with limousine
<br /> service constituted permissible customary home occupation).
<br />· * Osbornv. Planning Board of the To wn of Cotonie, 146A. D. 2d
<br /> 838, 536 N. Y.S.2d 244 (S. Ct. 198R) (social worker}proposed
<br /> home office use ~r the practice of her profession was not the
<br /> dominant use of the premises).
<br />
<br />Findlng Home Occupatlonal Use Invalid
<br />· tfohheimer v. Columbia County, 890P.2d447(Ore. App. 19959
<br /> (landowner} storage of equlpment and paving materials for a
<br /> paving busi,ess did not qs~ali~ as home occupation).
<br />· Criscione v. City of Albany Board of ZonlngAppeals, 185
<br /> A.D.2d 420, 585 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (S. Ct. 19929 (law office not
<br /> clearly incidental and secondary since lawyer did not reside in
<br /> the dwelling unit).
<br />
<br />/34
<br />
<br />· Baker v. Polsinelli, 177A.D.2d844, 576N. Y.S.2d460 (S. Ct.
<br /> 19919 (it was reasonableJ~r the zoning board to find that the
<br /> dance studio was more extensive than what was intended to be
<br /> permitted under the ordinance'as a home occupation).
<br />· Gzssidy v. Zoning Board of Adjustme'nt o/City ofpitUburgh, 559
<br /> A.2d 610 (Pa, Commw. 19899 (beauty shop was not home
<br /> occupation within meaning of general Z°ning ordlnance permiMng
<br /> home occupations in residentially zoned districts).
<br />· ]:rancai v. Zoning HearingBoard of the Borough o/New Brighton,
<br /> 543 A.2d 239 (Pa. Commw. 19889 (landowner} accounting office
<br /> did not quali~ as a vaad accesso~y use because it was not secondary
<br /> to the primary'use as a residence).
<br />· Rendin v. Zoning tfearingBoardofthe Borough o/Media, 488
<br /> A.2d391 (Pa. Commw. I9859 (zoning ordinancepermitted
<br /> professional offices in a residential district only if the practitioner
<br /> aho resided in the building).
<br />· Page v. Zoning Hearing Board of Walker Township, 471 A.2d
<br /> t348 (Pa. Commw. 19849 (vehicle i~upection and repair business
<br /> was not activity customarily associated with dwellings).
<br />
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