Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/02/1996

Home

Z.B. March 1996 -- Page 5 13;1 Stegeman claimed the zoning ordinance violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution. He said a past court decision forced zoning authorities to consider alternatives to the traditional family when defin- ing "family" in zoning ordinances. He also argued the ordinance unfairly pun- ished him and his company for contributing to the area's overpopulation, the limitation was irrational considering the number of fraternity houses and dormi- tories in the area, and that groups of unrelated students deserved the same protection as functional families under the ordinance. Finally, Stegeman claimed the ordinance violated the state Civil Rights Act because it discriminated on the basis of marital status. He asked the court for an order preventing the city from enforcing the ordinance. The court denied the order, and Stegeman appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The ordinance violated neither the Michigan Constitution nor the state Civil Rights Act. The past court decision did not support Stegeman's claims. In that case, the court ordered zoning authorities to accept certain alternatives to the traditional definition of "family." However, it explicitly stated ordinances could still dis- tinguish between biological and functional families, and a municipality did not have to "open its residential borders to transients and others whose lifestyle is not the functional equivalent of 'family' life." Ann Arbor's ordinance clearly allowed nontraditional families because it listed "functional family" as an accept- able living arrangement. The ordinance did not unfairly punish Stegeman in violation of the state constitution's due process clause. Stegeman did not prove the city singled him out to alleviate overcrowding problems. Nor did the ordinance violate the equal protection clause by not giving unrelated individuals the same protections as families. The court noted that, despite undergoing dramatic changes in recent years, the family "remains a fundamental building block of society." As such it deserved greater protection than "a ragtag collection of college roommates." Stegeman could not point to the neighborhood's collection of fraternity houses and dorms to show the ordinance was irrational. That argument applied to the zone, not the ordinance. Finally, the ordinance did not discriminate based on marital status. It pro- hibited seven unrelated individuals from living in the same household, whether or not they were married. If those seven individuals were all married to, but separated from, other people, the ordinance would still prohibit them from living together. Editor's note: The case on which Stegeman relied was Delta Charter Twt~. v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W. 2d 831 (1984). Peol~te v. ?erlos, 462 N. W. 2d 3JO (J990). Troy CamFus ~. City of Tro3; $49 N. W. 2d ]77 (]984).