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"long-range policy guide for development of the [municipality] as a whole," <br /> and all zoning regulations and decisions would have to comply with it. <br /> The borough told its Planning Commission to develop separate compre- <br /> hensive plans for certain communities within it, including the Chase area. <br /> The commission formed a citizens' advisory committee to help develop the <br /> Chase Comprehensive Plan. One of the advisory committee's recommenda- <br /> tions .was to discourage road construction in Chase, so area residents could <br /> preserve their "bush lifestyle." The commission thought otherwise, and the <br /> ordinance it enacted to establish the plan included the goal of approving roads <br /> on existing rights of way. <br /> P~ice, an advisory committee member, got 20 people in the Chase area to <br /> sign an application for a referendum petition regarding the plan. A state statute <br /> limited who could sign referendum petitions that affected only part of a muni- <br /> cipality to those living in that area. In the proposed referendum, only Chase <br /> residents would vote. <br /> The borough clerk rejected the application. She said it was invalid because <br /> it should have been held borough-wide, rather than only in Chase. <br /> Price sued the borough clerk. The court granted the clerk judgment without <br /> a trial, finding state planning laws preempted Price's right to a referendum. <br /> Price appealed. <br /> DECISION: Affirmed, but for different reasons. <br /> The lower court properly upheld the clerk's decision, but for the wrong <br /> reason. <br /> The referendum had to be open to all borough voters, not just Chase-area <br /> residents. The state statute limited who could sign the referendum petition, but <br /> not who could vote. <br /> Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susitna, 904 P2d 373 (2995). <br /> South Anchorage Concerned Coalition Inc. v. Coffey, 862 t~.2d 2 68 (2993). <br /> <br /> Signs: Village calls painted boulder a sign <br /> Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Hickey, <br /> 639 N.Y.S. 2d 480 (New York) 2996 <br /> The Hickeys owned 10 acres in the village of Old Field, on Long Island's <br />north shore. At the edge of the beach was an enormous boulder. On the side <br />facing the water, the Hickeys painted a 20-foot-high green shamrock with the <br />letter H in it. They also painted their name in letters 6 feet high. <br /> The village told the Hickeys their painting violated the zoning code's size <br />requirements for construction of signs. The code defined a "sign" as a structure <br />that displayed words, Ietters or pictures "in the nature of an announcement, <br />direction or advertisement." It defined "structure" as "[a]nything constructed <br />or erected which requires location on or in the ground or which is attached to <br />something located on or in the ground" other than fences less than 5 feet high. <br /> In response to the village's notice, the Hickeys applied for a variance. The <br />village's Zoning Board of Appeals denied it, saying "whether the painting is <br /> <br /> <br />