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Page 4'!J J, August 1996 Z.B. <br /> <br /> Ho!mberg claimed the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to his new <br />business. He said its definition of "adult uses . principal" was an overbroad <br />restriction of expression because it was not limited to those businesses that <br />were shown to cause adverse secondary effects. According to him, no studies <br />had sho~vn businesses such as his with off-premises consumption and a major- <br />ity of non-adult material caused negative secondary affects. He also said the <br />ordinance was vague because it didn't specify a time period during which the <br />20 percent figure should be calculated. <br /> The ~city argued the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place and man- <br />ner regulation and that its constitutionality had already been decided, so <br />Holmberg's argument was barred. <br /> The court granted the city judgment with regard to whether the ordinance <br />was content-neutral. However, it found questions existed about whether the <br />studies on which the city relied addressed the effects of adult bookstores with <br />no on-premises consumption of material. There were also questions about <br />whether the ordinance affected only the types of businesses shown to produce <br />negative effects. The court allowed the city to produce more evidence regard- <br />ing thoseissues. After the city submitted additional materials, the court found <br />the ordinance constitutional and granted the city's request. <br /> Holmberg appealed. <br />DECISION: Affirmed, in favor of the city. <br /> The Tower court properly found for the city. The ordinance was not over- <br />broad or Vague. <br /> The city had enough general information to enact a valid ordinance. The <br />city need not prove Holmberg's business would likely have the exact same <br />adverse effects as those businesses already studied. The city reasonably believed <br />Holmberg's business would negatively impact the neighborhood. <br /> The lack of a definite time period in which to calculate the 20 percent <br />figure did not make the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. Holm. berg v. City of Ramsey~ 800 F. Su_pp. 815 (1992). <br /> Dorso Trailer Sales v. American t~ody & Trailer, 482 N. W. 2d 77J (1992). <br /> <br />Wetlands -- Board rejects application after environmental department <br />approves it <br /> Frank v. Scheyer, 642 N.Y.S. 2d 956 (New York) 1996 <br /> Sometime before 1989, Frank bought a 19,983-square-foot lot in the town <br />of Islip, N.Y. Because the property was in a wetland district, she sought per- <br />mission from the New York State Department of Environmental Conversation <br />(department) to build a single-family home on it. <br /> Meanwhile, in 1989, the town enacted its own wetland overlay district. <br />Under the zoning ordinance, a property had to be at least one acre to have a <br />home on it. Frank's property, which had been of legal size when she bought it, <br />was now to° small. <br /> <br /> <br />