Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/04/1995

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Page 8 .. March 1995 Z.B. court entered its ruling, giving the Kawaokas time to apply. The city was not unreasonable in its nine-month delay in drafting the guidelines. The one-year delay in development caused by the water moratorium was reasonable and not a constitutional violation. Jurisdiction -- When is a Driveway a Roadway? In Re Rusin, 643 A.2d 1209 (VermonO 1994 Rusin owned an 8.9-acre rectangular plot of land in Manchester, Vt. He wanted to develop the land into four neighboring residential lots of roughly equal rectangular shape and size. The development would have a 740-foot access road with one 100-foot offshoot between the first and second lots. It would also have a 480-foot extension along the northern edge to reach lots three and four. The state Environmental Board had jurisdiction over the project under the "road rule," because it involved a road with a total length of more than 800 feet. In May 1989, the local Environmental Commission granted Rusin a land use permit for the housing development. In March 1990, the commission amended the permit to allow Rusin to build two ponds. Rusin built the ponds and the roadways. Rusin built the roadways basically according to plan, except that he short- ened the offshoot between lots one and two from the planned 100 feet to 56 feet. Rusin also narrowed the extension to lots three and four; he had decided to combine lots two and three, so only lot four needed access. In February 1992, the commission granted another amendment to the permit, this time to add conditions for maintaining a buffer strip on either side of a stream flowing through the property. In May 1992, Rusin asked the commission to declare that he had aban- doned the permit so the state Environmental Board would no longer have juris- diction over the project. The commission denied Rusin's request. He appealed to the state board, which also denied the request. Rusin appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. Rusin unsuccessfully argued the state Environmental Board should no longer have jurisdiction over the project because it was modified so that only 796 feet of road were actually built (four feet less than the total required length for application of the road rule). The commission and the board properly counted the 480-foot extension as road, not driveway.' Therefore, the total roadway was 1,276 feet, well over the 800 feet required for board jurisdiction. Despite the minor adjustments, neither the character of the intended use nor the amount of land had changed. In establishing the 800-foot threshold for jurisdiction, the board meant to entertain jurisdiction over significant developments. Rusin's project remained significant despite the changes. The board's jurisdiction was proper despite Rusin's argument that he had abandoned the land use permit by not performing "substantial construction" within two years after its issuance. Within that time, Rusin had begun clearing the land and building the roadways, ponds, and his private residence. This was substantial construction, and the board still had jurisdiction.