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Page 4 -- April 1995 Z.B. <br /> <br /> Whether or not Villari intended to cease pig farming, he lost his noncon- <br />forming use by failing to use his property as'a pig farm for such a long time. <br />The state Right to Farm Act did not override the township's power to regulate <br />land use. <br /> Villari suspended his nonconformifig use for a significant time without a <br />strong reason. Villari stopped pig .fa. rm!ng for at least seven years, based only <br />on "market conditions." Therefore; u. nder New Jersey law, he lost his right to <br />the nonconforming use regardless of whether he intended to abandon it. <br /> The Right to Farm Act did not override the town's ordinance forbidding <br />pig farming on properties smaller than 50 acres in Villari's zone. The act pro- <br />tected commercial farms from nuisance actions, it did not override municipal <br />authority to zone property within its boundaries. <br /> Palatine I v. Planning Board of Townshil~ of Montville, 628 A.2d 321 <br /> (1993). <br /> Carnara v. Board of Adjustrnents of Townshi£ of BeIleville, <br /> 570 A.2d 1012 (]990). <br /> <br /> Nonconforming Use -- County Waits More Than a Year to Prosecute <br /> Violation <br /> Johnson v. DeKalb County, 449 S.E.2d 3H (Georgia) 1994 <br /> Johnson owned property in DeKalb County, Ga. He had a building on his <br />property that became a nonconforming structure when the county amended its <br />zoning ordinance. Under the ordinance's grandfather clause, Johnson's build- <br />ing was considered a legal nonconforming use. <br /> Some time after the zoning law change, Johnson built an addition to the <br />nonconforming structure. More than a year after the county found out about the <br />addition, it prosecuted Johnson for maintaining a nonconforming structure. After <br />a trial, the Recorder's Court of DeKalb County found Johnson not guilty of <br />that offense because the county had not prosecuted Johnson within a year, as <br />required by the zoning ordinance. <br /> The county appealed to the Superior Court, arguing the limitations period <br />had not expired because a county ordinance stated that each violation would be <br />a separate offense. After the Recorder's Court made ':additional findings, the <br />Superior Court reversed its judgment. Because Johnson's nonconforming use <br />was continuing, the court found the county's case was not time-barred. In other <br />words, a new, year-long limitations period began each day Johnson had a non- <br />conforming structure on his property. The Superior Court returned the case to <br />the Recorder's Court for an order to this'effect. <br /> Johnson appealed. ~ <br />DECISION: Affirmed,' in favor of the county. <br /> The limitations period had not run out. A new limitations period started <br />each day Johnson had a nonconformin~ structure on his property. Johnson did <br />not challenge the ordinance, which clearly stated that each day a violation ex- <br />isted constituted a separate offense. His challenge to the county's application <br /> <br /> <br />