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Z.B. . June 15, 1995 -- Page 7 <br /> <br />store, which was a commercial use; the six neighboring acres that lay in the <br />office-institutional zone were designated as parking for the food store. After <br />the departments approved the plat, it was sent to the county planning commission. <br /> The p~anning commission rejected the plat, finding that the intended use <br />did not coimply with all the zoning ordinance's requirements. <br /> Publix~ sued the county, claiming its plans satisfied all ordinance require- <br />ments and that it had a clear legal right to approval. The court ordered the <br />county to ~pprove the plat. <br /> The co~unty appealed. <br />DECISION: Reversed, in favor of the county. <br /> Publix~did not have a clear legal right to approval because the plat violated <br />the county~'s zoning ordinance. Under the zoning ordinance,"accessory uses <br />had to be in the same zone as the buildings they served. Therefore, Publix's <br />parking facility had to be in the local-commercial zone if it was going to serve <br />the food s~ore. Even though parking lots were allowed as a principal use in the <br />office-indostrial zone, a variance or other exception was needed to have a com- <br />mercial a~essory use in a noncommercial zone. <br /> <br /> Residentii~l Use -- Neighbor Tries to Shut Down Sawmill Operation <br /> Futer~s v. Shultis, 618 N.Y.S.2d 127 (New York) t994 <br /> Futerfas and Shultis were neighbors in a residential zone in the town of <br />Woodstocl~, N.Y. They both had single-family homes on their properties. Shultis' <br />property v~as 2.2 acres and had once been part of a 500-acre farm that was in <br />Shultis' family for five generations. In 1987, Shultis and his uncle sold all but <br />the 2.2 acres for lumber-cutting and milling operations. Their agreement with <br />the new owner allowed Shultis to harvest wood from the sold property so he <br />could cont{inue his small-scale lumber business. <br /> In May~ 1989, the town passed a new zoning ordinance that included non- <br />conforming use provisions. In August 1989, Shultis bought a sawmill and put it <br />on his pro _getty. This improved his wood-cutting ability and increased the amount <br />of lumberihe stored from 2,000 feet to 4,000 or 5,000 feet. He also-stored <br /> r <br />3,000 feetlof logs on his property for sawing. Shultis bought a wood chipper <br />and started storing and selling wood chips. <br /> Shulti~' sawing activity was visible only from Futerfas' driveway. There <br />was no specific evidence that Shultis' business reduced the value of Futerfas' <br />property. Also, there was conflicting evidence regarding the level and duration <br />of the noise the mill created. <br /> Futerftis sued Shultis to stop him from operating the mill, claiming it vio- <br />lated zoning. He also sought damages for the nuisance he c/aimed the mill <br />created. The court granted Futerfas judgment without a trial, awarded him $1 <br />in damageS, and ordered Shultis to stop operating the sawmill. <br /> Both p~trties appealed. <br />DECISIOI~: Reversed and returned to the lower court. <br /> <br /> <br />