Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/05/1995

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Page 2 August 1995 Z.B. Junk3,ard-- Did Storage of Composting Materials Make Nursery a Junkyard? Ada County v. Gibson, 893 P. 2d 801 (Idaho) 1995 Gibson bought property in a rural transition zone of Ada County, Idaho. He planned to operate a tree and shrub nursery, which was a permitted use in the zone. Before Gibson could grow his stock in the property's poor quality soil, he had to add large amounts of compost. Gibson accumulated materials to pro- duce compost. The materials included organic substances (like grass clippings and leaves) and numerous pieces of working and defunct mechanical equip- ment, salvaged wood, scrap metal, wire fencing, bales of cardboard, barrels, tubing, used tires, etc. He intended to use the materials to build a composting machine that he would use to improve soil conditions. The county asked a court to order Gibson to stop using his land as a junkyard, which was a prohibited use in the rural transition zone. The county ordinance defined a junkyard as "[a]n outdoor space where waste, discarded or salvaged materials are bought, sold, exchanged, baled, packed, disassembled, stored or handled." Gibson said he ';vas not operating a junkyard because he was not in the business of buying and selling used or salvaged materials -- he said he was storing them with the intent to use them in connection with a permissible use (i.e., his nursery business). The court granted the county's request, ordering Gibson to remove from his property within six weeks all "compost equipment, scrap and salvage mate- rials, and mobile homes, or other structures." When Gibson did not comply with the order, the county asked the court to hold him in contempt. The court found Gibson in contempt and fined him $500. Gibson appealed. DECISION: Contempt order reversed. Gibson was not operating a junkyard. Under the ordinance, a junkyard was a commercial enterprise engaged in the storage, sale, or other handling of junk. The definition did not include storage'of salvaged items incidental to a permitted use. The county's argument relied on the ordinance's use of the words "stored or handled" when describing what a junkyard was. However, almost all the remaining words in the definition referred to commercial uses only. Therefore, the ordinance was ambiguous as to whether a junkyard had to be a business or whether it included ail places 'that stored junk outdoors. The common diction- ary meanings of the term included "a place where old metal, paper; etc. is kept, sorted, a~d soM or old cars are junked" and "a yard for the collection, storage, a~td resale of junk." The ordinance was intended to identify permitted and prohibited uses in the zone. The ordinance defined "use" as the purpose for which land was intended. That term did not include the appearance or condition in which prop- erty was maintained. Therefore, a junkyar.d was a property that had as/ts focal purpose the handling of junk, not one that simply appeared "junky" because it stored items incidental to another use. The county's interpretation of the ordinance was unnecessarily harsh -- it would prevent farmers and homeowners from storing even small amounts of salvaged items on their property.