Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/09/1995

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Z.B. October 1995 -- Page 3 Under a!section of the city code, "goods, materials and equipment" could be stored ou~tside in manufacturing districts as of right, and in another district with a special exception. (Neither applied to Vaughn's district.) Otherwise, outside storage of such items was a criminal offense. The code section did not specify what goods, materials, and equipment were. There were exceptions to the prohibition and a list of situations that were not considered "outside stor- age.'' Other code sections stated that the prohibition against outside storage did not extend ti> items ordinarily associated with permitted uses, allowing such storage as ag accessory use: The city~ cited Vaughn for violating the code by storing items outside. It gave him 15~days to comply. More than two months later, he had not corrected the violatio~s, so the city prosecuted him. Vaughn did not claim the stored goods were related to his business. After Va[3ghn was convicted, he appealed. He claimed the code section was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. DECISION:'iAffirmed. The section of the city code prohibiting outside storage was not unconstitu- tionally vague. It was reasonably definite in setting forth the prohibited con- duct. Ordinary people could understand (and did not have to guess at) what was prohibited, and the description of the criminal conduct did not encourage arbitrary an~ discriminatory enforcement. If the ma!erials Vaughn kept outside were stock or inventory for his busi- ness, it would not have been illegal to keep them there. However, Vaughn made no such claim and the items were not accessory to any permitted use of his property. Unless expressly stated in the ordinance, goods, materials, and equip- ment could aot be stored outside. Board of :Sut~ervisors v. Gaffney, 422 S.E. 2d 760 (1992). Kolenderi v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, ]03 S. Ct. ]855, 75 L.Ed. 2d 903 (]983). Mobile Home m Opponent Says Landowner Did Not Meet Variance Standard Belgarde;v. Kocher, 627 N. Y.S. 2d J28 (New York) 1995 Jones owned property in the village of Waddington, N.Y. She wanted to put a mobile ho~e on her property, but the zoning ordinance did not allow mobile homes in the district where the property lay. Jones applied to the village's Zon- ing Board of ;Appeals for a use variance. At the bo~ard's hearing, Jones claimed the property was not suited for a regular residO~ntial dwelling. However, she did not give any financial evidence to show the property would not produce a reasonable return if put to one of the zoning district's permitted uses. The board granted the use variance. It made reference to JOnes' financial concerns, but focused its hardship finding on the property's limited access and seasonal nature. Belgarde asked a court to annul the board's decision. Belgarde argued that Jones failed to show unique characteristics of the property that created an unnecessary hardship. She claimed Jones should not have gotten a use variance based on personal financial difficulties.