Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/09/1995

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g.g. October 1995 -- Page 5 On D~c. 22, 1993, the city issued Mellion a temporary Class A permit so he could ge[ the zoning changed to allow on-premises alcohol consumption. If successful, Mellion could get a permanent Class A permit. Also on that date, the city issued 29 liquor and beer permits to other establishments; several were in the sa~e zone as Mellion. In February 1994, Mellion asked the city's Planning and Zoning Commis- sion to reclassify the property. The commission refused to vote on the request and sent it to the City Council. At a meeting a few days later, the council heard comments about Mellion's bar. However, the council decided to wait until its March 8,:1994 meeting before taking action. It issued a public notice that it would coOsider at that meeting a zoning amendment to provide for a new zon- ing classification for bars and lounges. The d~y before the meeting, Mellion sued the city. He asked the court to order the gity to stop withholding the Class A permit. He argued that the zoning regulatioris regarding alcoholic beverage sales did not apply to him because they wer~ vague and were applied arbitrarily in violation of the state and fed- eral constitutions. The city asked the court to order Mellion not to use his business as a bar. The court entered an order pending trial which prohibited the city from withholdi~ng Mellion's permit. It ordered the city to issue all permits necessary for the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages on Mellion's premises, but did not state the reasons for its decision. The c~ty appealed. DECISION: Reversed, in favor of the city. The trial court improperly ordered the city to grant Mellion a Class A per- mit. The City did not have to issue an alcohol permit in violation of its own zoning rules. It was granted a permanent order prohibiting Mellion from sell- ing alcohol in open containers for on-premises consumption. There Was nothing vague in the zoning classification that prohibited bars or nightclubs. Although the ordinance did not define those terms, they were so commonly understood that the failure to define them did not make the ordi- na'nce unc6nstitutionally vague. Mellion admitted he was running a bar. Despite his claimsi a bar was no different from a nightclub. Mellion also did not prove that the city acted arbitrarily in issuing Class A Permits toiother businesses under the same zoning restrictions. The Class A permit hol~ers in Mellion's area were originally in zones that allowed night- clubs. They were grandfathered in under the new zoning ordinance. The citrY had the right to restrain ordinance violations. It showed that Mellion operated his business as a bar in violation of a valid zoning ordinance, so it was entitled to ia permanent order prohibiting Mellion from doing so. City Of New Orleans v. National Polyfab Corp., 420 So.2d 727 (1982). Food Town Inc. v. Town of Plaquemine, 174 So.2d 833 (1965).