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Finally, some courts have specifically <br />allowed the "written decision" by a munici- <br />pality explaining the reasons for denying <br />a zoning request to occur after it acts on a <br />zoning request by denying it. In the appro- <br />priate circumstance, this may allow a mu- <br />nicipality to comply with the shot clocks by <br />issuing a denial within the appropriate time <br />period and then issuing the separate written <br />decision shortly thereafter. <br />Even though, as of mid-zo11, the shot <br />clock orders are currently in effect, there <br />is serious doubt as to their validity. In part <br />this is due to language at the start of the <br />Act preventing any provision of the Federal <br />Communications Act of 1934 from being <br />used to "limit or affect" a municipality's <br />zoning authority other than as set forth in <br />the Act. The Act also indicates that there <br />should be individualized time periods <br />for each application, and the committee <br />report accompanying the Act states that <br />in terms of timing it is not intended to <br />give "preferential treatment" to cell tower <br />zoning applications compared to other <br />zoning matters. Finally, the committee <br />report emphasizes that the time for action <br />should be the "usual time period under the <br />circumstances." <br />A court appeal of the shot clock orders <br />on these (and other) grounds is currently <br />pending and is likely to be decided in late <br />zo11. Municipalities should periodically <br />check as to the outcome of this appeal, City <br />ofArlington v. FCC, No. 10-60039 (5th Cir.). <br />Substantial Evidence <br />The Act requires that there be "substantial <br />evidence" supportinga municipality's cell <br />tower zoning decisions. The cases are all in <br />agreement on this; specifically, the courts <br />have formulated the standard that there <br />must be "more than a scintilla but less than <br />a preponderance" of evidence in the written <br />record supporting a municipality's decision. <br />The courts have emphasized that this stan- <br />dard means they must uphold a municipal- <br />ity's decision if the facts meet the preceding <br />low standard even if the court would have <br />reached a different conclusion were it free to <br />consider the matter afresh. <br />In other words, the courts have stated <br />that they cannot substitute their judgment <br />for that of the municipality and try the zon- <br />ing case anew. However, this deference only <br />applies to factual support for substantive <br />matters such as the impact of a cell tower on <br />property values, the environment, or fragile <br />environmental areas. It does not apply to <br />claims for violations related to the radio fre- <br />quency emissions or "prohibition of service" <br />provisions of the Act. <br />The federal court covering mid -Atlantic <br />Coast states has emphasized that the views <br />of residents or laymen should be consid- <br />ered and may be given some weight by a <br />municipality. It also emphasized that the <br />"predictable barrage" of expert testimony <br />from a cell phone provider does not neces- <br />sarily trump or mandate approval of a cell <br />tower zoning request over the objections of <br />residents. Other courts have also allowed <br />citizen testimony to be used as evidence <br />to support a denial of a cell tower zoning <br />request. However, the issue of how much <br />weight to give to the testimony of ordinary <br />citizens tends to be case -specific and can <br />vary greatly depending on factors such as <br />effects from "cell tower radiation" will not <br />be allowed (because federal law prohibits <br />the municipality from considering them). <br />Second, if a speaker attempts to raise <br />such issues, he or she should promptly be <br />stopped on the same grounds. Third, if at- <br />tempts persist, it may be desirable to point <br />out that allowing testimony against the <br />tower based on RF health effects actually <br />increases the likelihood that the cell tower <br />will be approved. This is because the cases <br />are clear in holding that if the court be- <br />lieves the real reason for denial of a zoning <br />application was on RF-emissions grounds, <br />it will usually order that the zoning applica- <br />tion be granted. At a minimum, allowing <br />such testimony gives the cell tower ap- <br />plicant clear grounds to appeal a denial to <br />federal court. <br />Numerous cases under the Telecommunications <br />Act hold that the allowable grounds for local zoning <br />decisions on cellular towers include aesthetics, impact <br />on property values, proximity to a historic district, <br />safety, environmental impacts, and the impact of a <br />commercial operation on a residential neighborhood. <br />the number of statements and how detailed <br />and persuasive they are in terms of their <br />facts and reasoning. <br />Radio Frequency Emissions Preemption <br />The Act (47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7)(B) (iv)) pre- <br />vents municipalities from denying or con- <br />ditioning cell tower zoning based upon the <br />"environmental effects of radio frequency <br />emissions" (often pejoratively termed "ra- <br />diation") from cell towers, to the extent they <br />comply with FCC emission rules (47 C.F.R. <br />§ 1.1307 et seq.). This provision is part of the <br />more general federal preemption of states <br />and municipalities from regulating matters <br />relating to radio frequency (RF) emissions. <br />What municipalities may do is enforce the <br />FCC's emission rules, including reviewing a <br />tower's planned compliance with the rules. <br />Municipalities can face emotional <br />requests that a cellular zoning applica- <br />tion be denied due to RF-related health <br />concerns. The best legal advice in these <br />circumstances is three -fold: First, state <br />at the start of a zoning hearing that com- <br />ments or claims about the adverse health <br />SUBSTANTIVE ZONING RULES <br />Because the Act does not affect traditional <br />local substantive zoning principles, it is gen- <br />erally a local decision to choose between <br />having fewer, taller towers with more colo- <br />cations or more, shorter towers with less <br />colocation. Similarly, numerous cases under <br />the Act hold that the allowable grounds <br />for local zoning decisions on cellular tow- <br />ers include aesthetics, impact on property <br />values, proximity to or view from a historic <br />district or structure, safety (if the tower fell, <br />property or persons could be hurt, especially <br />on adjacent properties), environmental <br />impacts (e.g., fragile areas, wetlands), and <br />the impact of a commercial operation on a <br />residential neighborhood. <br />The courts have rejected tower company <br />complaints that local zoning requirements <br />can increase the cost of a tower, for example, <br />by requiring that it be camouflaged, or reject- <br />ing a single tower to be placed at the top of <br />the scenic ridge in favor of shorter towers on <br />either side that have a less prominent visual <br />impact. Aesthetic objections tied to scenic <br />vistas, proximity to historic districts, or views <br />ZONING PRACTICE 8.11 <br />AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION (pages <br />