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Finally, some courts have specifically
<br />allowed the "written decision" by a munici-
<br />pality explaining the reasons for denying
<br />a zoning request to occur after it acts on a
<br />zoning request by denying it. In the appro-
<br />priate circumstance, this may allow a mu-
<br />nicipality to comply with the shot clocks by
<br />issuing a denial within the appropriate time
<br />period and then issuing the separate written
<br />decision shortly thereafter.
<br />Even though, as of mid-zo11, the shot
<br />clock orders are currently in effect, there
<br />is serious doubt as to their validity. In part
<br />this is due to language at the start of the
<br />Act preventing any provision of the Federal
<br />Communications Act of 1934 from being
<br />used to "limit or affect" a municipality's
<br />zoning authority other than as set forth in
<br />the Act. The Act also indicates that there
<br />should be individualized time periods
<br />for each application, and the committee
<br />report accompanying the Act states that
<br />in terms of timing it is not intended to
<br />give "preferential treatment" to cell tower
<br />zoning applications compared to other
<br />zoning matters. Finally, the committee
<br />report emphasizes that the time for action
<br />should be the "usual time period under the
<br />circumstances."
<br />A court appeal of the shot clock orders
<br />on these (and other) grounds is currently
<br />pending and is likely to be decided in late
<br />zo11. Municipalities should periodically
<br />check as to the outcome of this appeal, City
<br />ofArlington v. FCC, No. 10-60039 (5th Cir.).
<br />Substantial Evidence
<br />The Act requires that there be "substantial
<br />evidence" supportinga municipality's cell
<br />tower zoning decisions. The cases are all in
<br />agreement on this; specifically, the courts
<br />have formulated the standard that there
<br />must be "more than a scintilla but less than
<br />a preponderance" of evidence in the written
<br />record supporting a municipality's decision.
<br />The courts have emphasized that this stan-
<br />dard means they must uphold a municipal-
<br />ity's decision if the facts meet the preceding
<br />low standard even if the court would have
<br />reached a different conclusion were it free to
<br />consider the matter afresh.
<br />In other words, the courts have stated
<br />that they cannot substitute their judgment
<br />for that of the municipality and try the zon-
<br />ing case anew. However, this deference only
<br />applies to factual support for substantive
<br />matters such as the impact of a cell tower on
<br />property values, the environment, or fragile
<br />environmental areas. It does not apply to
<br />claims for violations related to the radio fre-
<br />quency emissions or "prohibition of service"
<br />provisions of the Act.
<br />The federal court covering mid -Atlantic
<br />Coast states has emphasized that the views
<br />of residents or laymen should be consid-
<br />ered and may be given some weight by a
<br />municipality. It also emphasized that the
<br />"predictable barrage" of expert testimony
<br />from a cell phone provider does not neces-
<br />sarily trump or mandate approval of a cell
<br />tower zoning request over the objections of
<br />residents. Other courts have also allowed
<br />citizen testimony to be used as evidence
<br />to support a denial of a cell tower zoning
<br />request. However, the issue of how much
<br />weight to give to the testimony of ordinary
<br />citizens tends to be case -specific and can
<br />vary greatly depending on factors such as
<br />effects from "cell tower radiation" will not
<br />be allowed (because federal law prohibits
<br />the municipality from considering them).
<br />Second, if a speaker attempts to raise
<br />such issues, he or she should promptly be
<br />stopped on the same grounds. Third, if at-
<br />tempts persist, it may be desirable to point
<br />out that allowing testimony against the
<br />tower based on RF health effects actually
<br />increases the likelihood that the cell tower
<br />will be approved. This is because the cases
<br />are clear in holding that if the court be-
<br />lieves the real reason for denial of a zoning
<br />application was on RF-emissions grounds,
<br />it will usually order that the zoning applica-
<br />tion be granted. At a minimum, allowing
<br />such testimony gives the cell tower ap-
<br />plicant clear grounds to appeal a denial to
<br />federal court.
<br />Numerous cases under the Telecommunications
<br />Act hold that the allowable grounds for local zoning
<br />decisions on cellular towers include aesthetics, impact
<br />on property values, proximity to a historic district,
<br />safety, environmental impacts, and the impact of a
<br />commercial operation on a residential neighborhood.
<br />the number of statements and how detailed
<br />and persuasive they are in terms of their
<br />facts and reasoning.
<br />Radio Frequency Emissions Preemption
<br />The Act (47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7)(B) (iv)) pre-
<br />vents municipalities from denying or con-
<br />ditioning cell tower zoning based upon the
<br />"environmental effects of radio frequency
<br />emissions" (often pejoratively termed "ra-
<br />diation") from cell towers, to the extent they
<br />comply with FCC emission rules (47 C.F.R.
<br />§ 1.1307 et seq.). This provision is part of the
<br />more general federal preemption of states
<br />and municipalities from regulating matters
<br />relating to radio frequency (RF) emissions.
<br />What municipalities may do is enforce the
<br />FCC's emission rules, including reviewing a
<br />tower's planned compliance with the rules.
<br />Municipalities can face emotional
<br />requests that a cellular zoning applica-
<br />tion be denied due to RF-related health
<br />concerns. The best legal advice in these
<br />circumstances is three -fold: First, state
<br />at the start of a zoning hearing that com-
<br />ments or claims about the adverse health
<br />SUBSTANTIVE ZONING RULES
<br />Because the Act does not affect traditional
<br />local substantive zoning principles, it is gen-
<br />erally a local decision to choose between
<br />having fewer, taller towers with more colo-
<br />cations or more, shorter towers with less
<br />colocation. Similarly, numerous cases under
<br />the Act hold that the allowable grounds
<br />for local zoning decisions on cellular tow-
<br />ers include aesthetics, impact on property
<br />values, proximity to or view from a historic
<br />district or structure, safety (if the tower fell,
<br />property or persons could be hurt, especially
<br />on adjacent properties), environmental
<br />impacts (e.g., fragile areas, wetlands), and
<br />the impact of a commercial operation on a
<br />residential neighborhood.
<br />The courts have rejected tower company
<br />complaints that local zoning requirements
<br />can increase the cost of a tower, for example,
<br />by requiring that it be camouflaged, or reject-
<br />ing a single tower to be placed at the top of
<br />the scenic ridge in favor of shorter towers on
<br />either side that have a less prominent visual
<br />impact. Aesthetic objections tied to scenic
<br />vistas, proximity to historic districts, or views
<br />ZONING PRACTICE 8.11
<br />AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION (pages
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