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July 25, 2011 I Volume 5 1 No. 14 Zoning Bulletin <br />Here, there was no valid law governing signs and billboards at the <br />time the Sign Companies submitted their permit applications. There- <br />fore, under their proper applications for a permit, the Sign Companies <br />had a vested right to construct the billboards, concluded the court. <br />The Cities had argued that the Sign Companies' rights did not vest <br />because the Sign Companies did not own or have signed leasehold in- <br />terests in all of the properties on which the signs were to be located. <br />The court rejected this argument. It found the Cities failed to cite any <br />authority for that proposition that only applicants with ownership or <br />formal leasehold interest in the land may obtain vested rights. Rather, <br />the court noted that Georgia law was clear that: "a party holding an <br />option from the owner of the land, an agent of the owner, or a party <br />standing in any contractual relationship with the owner of the land" <br />whom "submits an application for a permit in accordance with appli- <br />cable ordinances, ... is entitled to issuance of the permit." Here, the <br />Sign Companies either owned the tract of land or had leases or infor- <br />mal agreements with the landowners of the tracts on which the signs at <br />issue were to be located. <br />The Cities had also argued "that the subsequent creation of new cit- <br />ies within unincorporated Fulton County ... divested the [S]ign [C]om- <br />panies of their vested rights." The court also rejected this argument. <br />The court noted that the Georgia Constitution, Article I, § I, Paragraph <br />Z, "forbids passage of retroactive laws which injuriously affect the <br />vested rights of citizens." The creation of the new Cities, thus, "could <br />not constitutionally and retroactively divest these companies of their <br />vested rights to construct signs pursuant to the applications they filed <br />in [the] County at a time when [the] County had no valid sign regula- <br />tions and the [C]ities did not yet exist." <br />See also: Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170 (1983). <br />See also: Recycle & Recover, Inc. v. Georgia Bd. of Natural Resources, <br />266 Ga. 253, 466 S.E.2d 197 (1996). <br />Case Note: The Cities had also argued that the Sign Companies' <br />vested rights were voided by Georgia Statutory law, OCGA S 36- <br />60-26. Section 36-60-26 prohibits the issuance by a county of <br />backdated sign permits for an area no longer within its jurisdic- <br />tion due to formation of a new city or annexation. The court also <br />rejected this argument. The court noted that statute was not en- <br />acted until "well after the time the [S]ign [C]ompanies filed their <br />applications and it [could] not retroactively be applied to divest <br />the [Sign] [C]ompanies of their vested rights." <br />6 © 2011 Thomson Reuters <br />