Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/03/2011

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September 25, 2011 I Volume 5 1 No. 18 Zoning Bulletin The Neighbors appealed. The circuit court reversed the Board's grant of a special exception and variance. The court found there was insufficient analysis of the inherent adverse effects associated with an equipment storage yard. The Mills appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the zoning vari- ance to permit the Mills to park paving equipment on their property was primarily one of convenience, and convenience was not sufficient to jus- tify an exception to the zoning requirement. In so holding, the court explained that: "[t]he general rule is that the authority to grant a variance should be exercised sparingly and only un- der exceptional circumstances." The court said that in order for a vari- ance to issue: (1) the property had to be unique and unusual such that the zoning provision impacted it disproportionately; and (2) a practical difficulty and/or unreasonable hardship resulted from that dispropor- tionate impact. Moreover, the county zoning ordinance provided that a variance could only be granted if there is a showing of practical difficulty or un- due hardship. The court said that, in regard to area variance requests — as was the request here —the less restrictive "practical difficulties" stan- dard applied. The county zoning ordinance defined "practical difficulty" as where: strict compliance would unreasonably prevent the use of the property for a permitted purpose or render conformance unnecessarily burdensome; denying the variance would do substantial injustice to the applicant; and granting the variance would observe the spirit of the ordi- nance and secure public safety and welfare. Here, all parties agreed that the Mills' property was unique due to the size and shape of the lot. However, the court found that the Mills' stated reasons for the variance (i.e., security issues, increased time to retrieve equipment, and increased costs) were valid but primarily reasons of con- venience. The law was clear, said the court: "[t]he need sufficient to jus- tify an exception must be substantial and urgent and not merely for the convenience of the applicant ...." The court also concluded that the Board's' conclusions as to the grant of the special exception were: "insufficient because it merely presented conclusions without pointing to any evidentiary basis." The court ex- plained that, in evaluating the Mills' special exception request, the Board's duty was to judge: whether the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected; and whether the Mills' proposed use was in harmony with the general purpose and in- tent of the zoning plan. The Board "did not address the adverse effects of storing contractor's equipment, nor did it address how [the Mills'] storage of paving equipment would be different," found the court. The 6 © 2011 Thomson Reuters