Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/02/2012

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August 25, 2011 I Volume 51 No. 16 Zoning Bulletin Speech Clause protects signs, as they are "a form of expression." Signs may be regulated to protect public interests, but the constitutional- ity of the sign regulations depends on whether the sign restrictions are content-based or content - neutral. If content - neutral, the restrictions are subject to intermediary scrutiny. If content- based, the restrictions are constitutionally permissible only if they withstand strict scrutiny. Here, the Court of Appeals found the Zoning Code's definition of "sign" was "impermissibly content -based because `the message con- veyed determines whether the speech is subject to the restriction.'" ,Here, under the City's Zoning Cod e, whether an object is a "sign" or is exempt from the sign regulations, depended on its content. An object of the same dimensions of Sanctuary's "End Eminent Domain Abuse" sign/mural would not have been subject to the City Zoning Code sign regulations if it were a "[n]ational, state, religious, fraternal, profession- al and civic symbol ...." Thus, the regulations were content -based be- cause they made impermissible distinctions based solely on the content or message conveyed in the sign. Because the definition of "sign" was found to be a content - -based restriction, strict scrutiny applied. The regulations would only be con- stitutional and enforceable if the City could show they were necessary to serve a compelling state interest that was narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 'Here, the City asserted interests of traffic safety and aesthetics as rea- sons for the sign restrictions. The court noted these interests "have nev- er been held to be compelling." Moreover, the court said that even as- suming they were adequate justification for the content-based sign-reg- ulations, "the sign code [could] not withstand strict scrutiny because it [was] not narrowly drawn to accomplish those ends." The Zoning Code did not explain how the interests of traffic safety and aesthetics were served by the sign regulations, nor did it offer reasons for applying its sign regulations to some types of signs but not others. In other words, the City "fail[ed] to demonstrate how those] interests [were] served by the distinction it [drew] in the treatment of exempt and nonexempt cat- egories of signs." See also: Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo., 54 E 3 d 1400, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1910 (8th Cir. 1995). See also: Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 9 Ed. Law Rep. 23, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2766 (1983). Case Note: The Court of Appeals remanded to the district court the issue of whether the unconstitutional portion of the sign or- 4 © 2011 Thomson Reuters